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Purpose This paper examines the role of powerful entities in shaping 
international accounting standards. The purpose of this thesis is to 
identify whether and to what extent the different actors influence 
changes in the leasing standard-setting process, and provide an in-
depth understanding of the political influences throughout the 
development of the leasing accounting standard.  
Methodology In this paper the qualitative research strategy with an inductive view is 
applied. To examine the official documents, such as comment letters, 
content analysis, as a research method, was chosen.  
Theoretical 
perspective 
The theoretical framework is based on the model of bases of power in 
order to identify the key actors in the IASB standard-setting and the 
one-dimensional view of power in order to distinguish the influential 
actors. In addition to this, the accounting standard-setting process is 
explored by the lens of regulatory space, while also incorporating the 
tool of regulatory conversations. 
Empirical 
Foundation 
25 key actors were identified based on the French and Raven’s (1959) 
power model. Next, those actors’ submitted comment letters were 
considered on the leases project stages of DP, ED and Re-ED. In total 
18 actors engaged in the due process by sending comment letters, 
which formed the sample of 57 comment letters for the basis of the 
documentary analysis. 
Conclusion This study reveals that the key actors over the IASB are various 
regulators, standard-setters, accounting firms and several 
representatives from profession and industry. No key actors seem to 
be outside the regulatory space. Some of the key actors significantly 
influence the standard, which are found attributable to the resources 
held by them. The findings also indicate that the involvement and 
positions of the key actors at such strategic times can dramatically 
affect the standard development. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Accounting standard-setting process has attracted researchers’ attention over years. A 
lot of studies have been undertaken on national level (Susela, 1999; Hope & Gray, 
1982; McKinnon & Harrison, 1985; Hussein & Ketz, 1991; Miller et al. 1998) as well as 
international level (Kwok & Sharp, 2005; Cortese, 2006; Cortese & Irvene, 2010). Many 
authors identify that international standard-setting process has two dimensions: first, it is 
a technical dimension and second, it is political nature (Demski, 1973; Gerboth, 1973; 
Horngren, 1973; Cushing, 1977; Bromwich, 1980). The objective of this paper is to 
explore the political nature of the accounting standard-setting process for which the 
ongoing project of the leasing standard has been chosen. 
Over the past decades there has been an increasing criticism of the existing lease 
standard which has been claimed to encourage deliberate structuring of lease 
transactions as operating leases resulting in off-balance sheet reporting, hence, not 
meeting the needs of financial statements’ users. Therefore, great attention has been 
drawn towards a new leases standard development with the aim to enhance the 
transparency of reported information to investors, analysts and other users of financial 
statements about the amount, timing and uncertainty of cash flows arising from a lease 
(IFRS Foundation, n.d.). Accounting for leases is of particular importance to many 
entities as leases and their treatment in financial statements can affect gaining access 
to assets, obtaining financing, and reducing an organization’s exposure to the risks of 
asset ownership (IFRS Foundation, n.d.).  
Currently, according to the IAS 17 standard, leases are classified as either finance or 
operating leases. Finance leases “transfer substantially all the risks and rewards of 
ownership, and give rise to asset and liability recognition by the lessee and a receivable 
by the lessor” while operating leases are expensed by lessees and the remaining assets 
are recognised by the lessors (Deloitte, 2015). However, lease assets and liabilities in 
operating leases are not required to be recognised by a lessee. Therefore, this model is 
among the most controversial topics of financial reporting as it does not always give a 
faithful representation of leasing transactions for investors, analysts and other users. It 
also omits significant information about assets and liabilities which arise from operating 
leases. For this reason, the amounts reported in a lessee’s financial statements are 
adjusted by many investors and analysts in order to reflect the assets and liabilities 
arising from off-balance sheet leases. Although, because of the limited information on 
the consequential adjustments, the estimates made are often inaccurate (IFRS 
Foundation, n.d.). Therefore, many financial statements’ users and other stakeholders 
have made requests to change accounting guidelines, abolish these differences and 
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treat all leases as financial leases. As a result, as claimed by the standard-setters, the 
development of a new standard will help to increase transparency and comparability 
among various companies by recognizing lease assets and liabilities on the balance 
sheet and disclosing essential information (IASB & FASB, 2015). However, the 
proposed changes have become controversial, as opponents of the new standard 
emphasize increased costs of compliance and complexity of the standard as the main 
reasons of their dissatisfaction. 
Development of a leasing standard was initiated in 2006 and represents a part of the 
convergence project of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (IASB & FASB, 2009). The Discussion Paper (DP) 
on Leasing Standard was issued in March 2009 and the Exposure Draft (ED) was 
published in August 2010, while the Re-Exposure Draft (Re-ED) was issued in May 
2013. The final standard is expected to be issued at the end of 2015 (IASB & FASB, 
2015).  
1.2. Problem formulation and study contributions 
Accounting of leasing has been a much debated issue and discussion of standard 
setting based on the case of leasing could provide a clear picture of influential actors, 
and the compromises achieved through this process. The leasing case is especially 
interesting as there has been a high level of interest of various stakeholders, as well as 
disagreements involved regarding IASB’s proposed changes demonstrated by the fact 
that the exposure draft had to be reissued and the whole standard-setting stage had to 
be repeated. The case of the leasing standard attracts more attention also because it 
represents a part of the convergence project of the IASB and FASB, therefore, 
involvement of more stakeholders can be expected.  
The prior research on the topic of leasing standard includes three papers that are 
positioned in lobbying literature. Two of them discuss lobbying based on the DP (‘09) 
and ED (‘10) documents (Betz & Pozzobon, 2011; Kort, 2011). However, their research 
papers are focused on analysis of corporate lobbying based on comment letters from 
companies (i.e. preparers) and do not consider other actors that also may be influential 
in the standard-setting process. The remaining third paper discusses lobbying based on 
all three documents issued by the IASB (DP, ED & Re-ED) (Bermejo & Esteban, n.d.). 
However, its scope is limited as it only researches the intensity of lobbying for different 
countries based on the number of submissions of comment-letters without analysing 
stance of respondents or any other contents of comment letters. All these research 
papers heavily rely on accounting choice literature.  
Our research tries to close the existing gap in literature by considering the influences 
from various interested powerful parties, and therefore, not limiting our attention to one 
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specific group. It also gives a more complete picture of the standard setting process as 
it includes reactions from different parties not only regarding the DP and ED, but also 
Re-ED. Therefore, our paper is unique as it provides an in-depth analysis of the 
influences in all three stages (DP, ED & Re-ED).  
We contribute to the literature on political influences in the accounting standard -setting. 
We analyse the case using models of power and influence, as they allow us to 
distinguish key actors in the leasing standard-setting and identify influential ones among 
key actors. We also apply regulatory space theory as it allows us to consider 
relationships of different actors. Accounting standard-setting, especially on international 
level, has not been extensively analysed in terms of political influences, nor using 
concepts of regulatory space, therefore, we add to the diversity of accounting research.  
Our study also contributes to respondents’ knowledge regarding standard-setting 
process and various interested parties, as well as enhances understanding about the 
influences of those actors during the process, in the light of the changes in the 
regulatory arena. It is particularly important for all financial statements’ preparers and 
users to have a complete and clear picture of leasing standard changes as treatment of 
leases in financial statements can affect raising finance, as well as completely transform 
the market for leasing activities.  
1.3. Purpose and research questions 
This thesis studies the role of different actors that are affected by and have an interest 
in the accounting standard development. In particular, this paper examines the role of 
powerful entities in shaping international accounting standards. The purpose of our 
thesis is to identify whether and to what extent the different actors influence changes in 
the leasing standard setting process, and provide an in-depth understanding of the 
political influences throughout the development of the leasing accounting standard.  
Research Question asks: 
Which are the key actors and is it possible to see whether some of those actors are 
more successful than others in influencing the IASB standard-setting process based on 
the case of the lease standard?  
1.4. Research Limitations 
The scope of this thesis involves the IASB’s standard-setting process based on the 
case of lease accounting. For answering the second research question, the focus is 
made on four focus areas of the ROU model, lease term, short-term leases and dual 
accounting model. Due to the magnitude of the standard changes this concentration has 
been chosen, as not all issues could have been covered. However, the identification of 
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changes in major issues will give insight into influential actors overall for the leasing 
standard. 
1.5. Research structure 
This paper is organized in the following manner. In Chapter 2, we provide an overview 
of the existing literature of the research and introduce our theoretical framework. Then, 
in Chapter 3 the research approach and chosen methods are discussed. Next, in 
Chapter 4, we introduce the institutional context of the IASB and its due process. 
Subsequently, the key actors are identified and presented. Later, in Chapter 5 we 
present the leasing project and explain the proposed lessee accounting model, as well 
as other selected focus areas. In Chapter 6 the comment letters from key actors on 
identified focus areas are examined. Later, in Chapter 7 we discuss the empirical 
findings in the light of the regulatory space concept and one-dimensional power model. 
Chapter 8 presents our conclusions, while Chapter 9 identifies the limitations and 
contributions of our study and provides the future research opportunities.  
Jamburia & Lankevičiūtė (2015). Political Influences on the IASB Accounting Standard-Setting: The Case of the Leases Standard 
5 
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
This chapter presents the design of theoretical framework and introduces the concepts 
of power, interests and influence, which is followed by the review of the concept of 
regulatory space around which the framework is established. It also subsequently 
presents previous literature based on the regulatory space theory and regulatory 
conversations. Based on these earlier research studies an analytical framework is 
developed.  
2.1. Power and Interests 
Power has been defined by political scientists in many different ways. One of the most 
famous definitions of power has been that of Lukes (2005, p.37): “A exercises power 
over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. As we can see we 
cannot explain the term of power without first explaining what ‘ interests’ represent. 
There are three views of power that Lukes (2005) has described that in turn approach 
the term of interest in different ways. 
The one-dimensional or ‘pluralist’ view of power used by Dahl, Polsby and others, 
focuses on the actual exercise of power by examining which participants initiated 
alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives suggested by others or 
had recommended proposals that were rejected. Such a method would lead one to 
identify individual cases of ‘successes’ and ‘defeats’ of participants, where the parties 
with the most number of successes would be supposed to be the most influential. 
Hence, the object of examination is an actual conflict between participants’ interests 
over certain issues. Interests are voiced in policy preferences that can be observed 
through actors’ political participation. In the absence of an observable conflict, it is not 
possible to exercise power and thus, identify powerful actors (Lukes, 2005).  
The two-dimensional view proposed by Bachrach and Baratz broaden the term of 
‘power’ by encompassing the non-decision making ability into the definition, i.e. actors 
can exercise power not only when certain issues are discussed, but by also creating 
barriers for some policy issues to arise and hence, affecting the agenda formation 
process. Interests of participants can be observed by examining their policy preferences 
or grievances of that their interests were not incorporated in policies. Bachrach and 
Baratz similar to pluralists maintain that the power can be observed through the actual 
conflict over issues and potential issues (Lukes, 2005).  
On the contrary to the first two philosophies of power, the three-dimensional view 
argues that the conflict of interests simply may not arise at all because some actors can 
influence, shape or determine others’ wants. Interests here are themselves a product of 
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a system which tries to exercise power rather than a conscious choice of individuals 
which would have been different if the influence of this system had not existed. 
Therefore, the ability to modify one’s real interests into the ones desired by specific 
actors can be the supreme exercise of power attributable to such actors (Lukes, 2005). 
Such a view considers power as a wider term than the previous two as it incorporates 
the importance of ideologies affecting social preferences as a significant type of power.  
2.1.1. Bases of Power 
Different classifications of influence have been identified by various authors over years. 
For instance, Wrong (1979) categorises them as the following: force, manipulation, 
persuasion and authority. Ledyaev (1997, cited in Kwok & Sharp, 2005) distinguishes 
six forms: force, coercion, inducement, persuasion, manipulation and authority. One of 
the most well-known classifications of influences has been provided by French and 
Raven (1959), prominent representatives of social psychology. They provide a specific 
model of identifying different sources of social power.  
French and Raven (1959) define power in terms of influence and influence in terms of 
change which includes changes in behaviour, opinions, attitudes, etc. Discussion of the 
basis of power necessitates examining the relationship between O and P, which is the 
source of power. Five bases of O’s power are: (1) reward power, (2) coercive power, (3) 
legitimate power, (4) referent power, (5) expert power. The existence of all of these 
bases of power depends on P’s perception that O has the ability to exert the mentioned 
type of power, e.g. the ability to mediate punishments for P as for (2) coercive power 
(French & Raven, 1959). 
The ability to reward gives rise to reward power. The strength of the reward power 
depends on P’s perception that O has the ability to reward and increases and 
decreases of this power depend on the P’s perception of the probability that O will 
mediate the reward for conformity. The use of the reward power will increase the 
attraction of P towards O and will empower O to induce greater changes. Coercive 
power stems from P’s perception that in case he is not successful to conform to the 
influence of O, then P wi ll be punished as a consequence. The strength of the coercive 
power will depend on the perceived effects of punishment as well as perceived 
probability to avoid such negative results. There is a certain similarity between reward 
power and coercive power. However, they are still distinguishable, as for reward power 
conformity stems from the desire to get benefits whereas for coercive power conformity 
is due to the fear of rejection or punishment. Legitimate power of O over P stems from 
“internalized values of P that O has a legitimate right to influence P and that P has an 
obligation to accept this influence” (French & Raven, 1959, p.153). The presence of 
authority gives rise to a legitimate power; for instance, P will accept the legitimate 
authority of O which holds a superior position in the hierarchy. However, legitimate 
Jamburia & Lankevičiūtė (2015). Political Influences on the IASB Accounting Standard-Setting: The Case of the Leases Standard 
7 
 
power is not limited to authority, but can also appear where P accepts the standard or 
code that an external agent has a right to exert influence. The referent power denotes to 
the situation where P identifies himself with O. For instance, if P is associated with O, P 
will have the desire to maintain this relationship. Such identification is achieved, when P 
acts, believes or thinks as O does. O has the ability to influence P, not because P is 
afraid of sanctions (use of reward or coercive power) but because P perceives O to be a 
person/entity of high reputation and he also wants to be associated with such prestige. 
Notably, P may not be aware that O holds and exercises the referent power over P. 
Expert power denotes to P’s perception of O’s knowledge in a given area, which is 
compared to P’s knowledge of that area as well as an absolute standard. Expert power 
results in social influence on P’s cognitive structure. In cases where P accepts 
information from O because of his credibility, expert power is exercised. Expert power 
also has another dimension which is called ‘informational power’, in such a case the 
content of communication is examined and the logic of argument and persuasion tends 
to represent an influence (French & Raven, 1959). For all types of power, the stronger 
the basis of power, the greater the power. 
2.2. Background of Regulatory Space 
The first systematic study of the regulatory space concept was undertaken by Hancher 
and Moran (1989). However, during the past thirty years much more information has 
become available on this theory (e.g. Young, 1994; MacDonald & Richardson, 2004; 
Jonnergård & Larsson, 2007; Jonnergård, 2012). According to the authors, this concept 
is particularly useful for investigating the impact on the accounting alteration processes 
as it lets us to understand which actors participate and how they influence the regulation 
process. Black (2002) and Jonnergård and Larsson (2007) state that the regulatory 
process is also inconceivable without regulatory conversations during which regulatory 
issues and interests are raised and appropriate solutions are made.  
2.2.1. Hancher and Moran (1989)  
Hancher and Moran (1989) were the first to introduce the concept of ‘regulatory space’. 
The authors consider the regulation of economic activity in advanced capitalistic 
societies to form their views on common patterns of regulation. Regulatory space is a 
concept defined by the “range of regulatory issues subject to public decision” (Hancher 
& Moran, 1989, p.277). The authors identify the most distinguished features of 
economic regulation, suggest that the regulation is best understood through “the 
analytical device of ‘regulatory space’” and explain how national political and legal 
settings, historical timing, organizational structure, the character of markets, and the 
nature of issue arenas all influence the shape of regulatory space and the distribution of 
power within that space (Hancher & Moran, 1989, p.271).  
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According to Hancher and Moran (1989) economic regulation is dominated by relations 
between large, sophisticated and administratively complex organizations, such as 
government departments, regulatory agencies, industrial associations and corporations. 
Understanding economic regulation means understanding a process or intermediation 
and bargaining between large and powerful organizations in the light of extensive state 
involvement. Importantly, Hancher and Moran (1989) argue against ‘regulatory capture 
theory’ which assumes that all regulation should be in public interest and that private 
influences on regulation can damage public interest. Instead, they claim that nowadays 
it is difficult to draw a distinction between private and public firms, especially 
emphasizing the fact that many large private firms carry out activities of mainly public 
character, because of which this theory is no longer relevant. On the contrary, the 
authors argue that to understand the regulatory activity, one should ask who 
participates in and benefits from regulation and explain the complex and shifting 
relationships between and within organizations that can impact economic regulation 
(Hancher & Moran, 1989). 
Hancher and Moran (1989) state that different institutions share a common regulatory 
space. The critical issue to analyse this shared space is to understand “the rules of 
admission, the relations between occupants, and the variations introduced by 
differences in markets and issue arenas” (Hancher & Moran, 1989, p.276). 
The authors also identify major features of regulatory space. Regulatory space is 
available for occupation and it can be unevenly divided between actors: there will be 
major and minor participants in the regulatory process. Regulatory space occupants are 
engaged in a fierce struggle for advantage. The outcomes of the struggles, the 
resources used and the distribution of these resources among involved institutions 
should be considered to explain the concept. Furthermore, some participants may be 
‘included’ in space whereas others may be ‘excluded’ from it. Regulatory issues can 
also enter and leave space. To understand who is in and who is out, as well as who has 
power is critically dependant on the analysis of the organizational relationships in a 
regulatory space, whereas understanding why some issues are included and others 
excluded, requires an examination of how participants define the scope of regulatory 
space and become committed to it. Similarly, changes in the perceptions of what issues 
should be included can be explained by the shifting balance of power within and 
between occupants of the regulatory space (Hancher & Moran, 1989). Hancher and 
Moran (1989) point out that factors that shape regulatory space and power allocation 
among its occupants are many and complex.  
Regulation occurs in particular places and times. Different national traditions of political 
and legal cultures influence access to regulatory space by different types of actors. 
Historical timing is also crucial in the shaping of the regulatory space (Hancher & 
Moran, 1989). Regulation is an organized activity and organization in turn requires 
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resources, such as knowledge and expertise, as well as financial and human resources 
to design rules and create and run regulatory institutions. Organizations who dominate 
these resources at those critical moments when regulations are devised will be powerful 
actors in regulatory space. An importance of historical timing is also emphasized by the 
fact that changes in regulation are often induced by crisis. The balance of insti tutional 
forces and historical configuration at the moment of crisis can be detrimental in shaping 
regulations. During crises pressure of time is present which drives accelerated 
development of rules because of which, regulators have incentives to copy similar 
regulations from elsewhere (Hancher & Moran, 1989).  
Everyday practice of regulation involves relations between individuals but only those 
individuals are allowed to access regulatory space that have some organizational role. 
Therefore, organizational status is the most vital condition limiting access to regulatory 
space, which is even more pronounced in multinational regulatory arenas. Individuals 
without organizational affi liation can seldom contribute to regulatory processes. 
Organizations are seen as shapers of regulation whereas individuals are ‘takers’ of 
regulation. Organizations that are dominant in regulatory space are usually big and are 
characterized by large hierarchical bodies, and there is usually no single organizational 
entity that can cause regulatory change. Therefore, the existence of powerful actors 
with complex hierarchical structures requires inter-organizational co-operation in order 
to accomplish any regulatory activity. This co-operation is always coupled with pursuit of 
institutional advantage by actors, e.g. for an advantage in the market or the ability to 
significantly influence regulatory processes. Regulation is done by and through 
organizations, variations of which influence the nature of the activity and affect 
allocation of power within regulatory space as well as perceptions of what should be 
regulated and how certain goals are achieved (Hancher & Moran, 1989).  
The ways in which issues are identified and assigned to specific regulatory arenas are 
influenced by certain ideological constructions, as well as dynamism of market 
economies, which should also be taken into account. Advancement of these economies 
has led to multinational regulatory arenas, which are marked by greater struggles for 
advantage and less compromises. Whether activities take place in national or 
international arenas, the most important characteristic of regulatory space remains the 
same: it is shaped by relations of interdependence among occupants of this space that 
are powerful state and non-state organizations (Hancher & Moran, 1989). 
2.2.2. Young (1994)  
The regulatory space theory perspective is applied in Young’s (1994) research in order 
to investigate the enacting changes which occur or fail to occur in the complex 
processes of accounting recognition practices. The entity which is responsible for those 
modifications in the United States is the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB). It 
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maintains a technical agenda of accounting projects which will be altered in the future. 
The Board resides within a constricted institutional nexus deployed between the state 
and accounting profession and it acts in a broader social and economic environment. 
Therefore, according to the author, in order to comprehend how the accounting issues 
emerge onto the agenda, it is important to look beyond the boundaries of the FASB and 
explore the wider space in which the organization operates and regulations of 
accounting changes arise. All the change processes in financial accounting practices 
occur in the regulatory space which is seen as an abstract conceptual space which is 
constructed by various people, organizations and events that exert influence on 
accounting and accounting practices. Moreover, it allows encompassing the number of 
accounting issues for which a standard-setting action rationale can be prepared (Young, 
1994). 
According to Young (1994), there are several advantages for using the regulatory space 
metaphor as it not only acknowledges the complexity of the standard-setting and 
agenda formation processes but also it stands as a broad theoretical lens which 
concentrates on the concern of agenda creation. This lens leads the researcher to 
formulate the question: who belongs and are involved in these processes? Therefore, 
researchers must widen the boundaries of the organizational investigations of the FASB 
and take into account the roles of the other actors, such as the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), auditors and financial statements’ preparers. Moreover, 
this research distinguishes that the FASB is not acting in a vacuum as accounting 
alteration and the shaping of demands for accounting change arise both inside and 
outside the organization’s boundaries. By contrast, the Board acts in the broader social 
and economic environment with an interaction to the other actors and organizations that 
belong to the regulatory space. Further, by using this theoretical lens, the research does 
not assume to explain the dominance of interests of the FASB and other actors. 
Instead, interests are identified as constructed and can only be interpreted depending 
on the particular situations. Therefore, the interests of all the regulatory space actors 
are interpreted, constructed and reconstructed while they construct and link different 
issues, actions and solutions. On the whole, the regulatory space metaphor stresses the 
need of a deeper investigation of the actors and institutions that contribute to the 
accounting alteration processes (Young, 1994).  
In order to explain how the accounting issues emerge into the FASB agenda, the study 
of Young (1994) investigates three different accounting issues, such as accounting for 
loan fees, the case of leasing accounting and non-profit organizations accounting. The 
author finds that not all accounting questions easily appear in the standard-setting 
projects as they must be formulated and interpreted appropriately for FASB standard-
setting actions. Moreover, the studies reveal that the interpretation of expectations 
about the role and objectives of standard-setters are also a part of the agenda formation 
which is not a simple consequence of pressures from single interested actors. Finally, 
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the agenda formation was used to build arguments by the Board and other regulatory 
space members to stress the need of changes in the accounting practices on the 
particular situations. However, the research does not exhaustively specify the number of 
responses available to the standard-setter and other actors and therefore, it 
demonstrates the complexity of the agenda formation process (Young, 1994).  
It is also worth to consider the conclusion which Young (1994) draws from her study as 
it helps to gain insight into standard-setters environment and actions, as this thesis also 
focuses on the context and structure of a standard-setter the IASB. The three case 
studies performed in the loan fees, leases and non-profit organization’s accounting 
reveal that the FASB does not participate alone in the constructing accounting problems 
process. Instead, the occupants of the regulatory space, such as the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the SEC and Congress, also contribute to the 
accounting problems formulation. This process heavily relies on the presence and 
interpretation of wide range of participants in the regulatory space.  
For example, in the case of loan fees accounting, the FASB reduced the ability for 
savings and loan organizations to lobby effectively and their active role in the regulatory 
space was precluded. While in the case of accounting for leases, the regulatory space 
was overcrowded by many different actors who had conflicting points of view about the 
accounting problem and its solution formulation. Therefore, the Board, with the help of 
the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC) and its preference of the 
SEC, decided to increase the crowding in the regulatory space even more. It implies 
that the FASB used the tactic of delaying in order to escape from the lease accounting 
issue’s inclusion into the agenda and also from taking improper actions. In the case of 
accounting for non-profit organizations as well as in different accounting issues, the 
actors in the regulatory space may change through the time.  
Moreover, the study of Young (1994) shows that if actors take part in the problem 
construction process, it does not imply that they will also participate in the resolution 
processes. Nevertheless, consequential participation is highly institutionalized. 
Furthermore, the research identifies those individuals who serve on committees or fulfil 
their employee roles as frequent participants in the regulatory space. Academics and 
the assumed financial statements’ users, for instance creditors or investors, seldom 
appear in the regulatory arena (Young, 1994). In conclusion, Young’s (1994) research 
points out that an understanding of accounting-setting is closely related to the 
perception of the claims of accounting role and expectations about standard-setters who 
create the regulatory space for accounting alteration.  
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2.2.3. Black (2002)  
According to Black (2002), regulation is not only an activity performed by state actors 
and involving legal mechanism but it is seen as the intentional, global-directed and 
problem-solving effort undertaken by both state and non-state participants. Moreover, 
regulators might act at a transnational, multinational, national or sub-national level. 
Therefore, communications between all participants in the regulatory process are an 
important part of their operation. This process is defined by the author as regulatory 
conversations which consist of the communicative interactions between all involved 
regulators, governments, associations, firms or individuals, professional advisors, 
creditors, auditors and other actors in the regulatory system. All forms of interpersonal 
communications which are extended beyond standards, policy documents, guidance 
notes including all micro-level discussions that might arise in formal or informal settings, 
policy briefings, conferences or seminars, in the course of the regulatory process 
among individuals within and across organizations or specific interconnected 
communities, are also included into this term. In addition, regulatory conversations 
create an understanding of the definition of problems and their suitable and appropriate 
resolutions, as well as the operational categories and the identities of and relations 
between those participants in the process are also produced (Black, 2002).  
The study of Black (2002) identifies a number of situations where regulatory 
conversations are particularly significant elements of regulations. First, these patterns 
can be found in the regulatory process where reliance on written norms is present and 
discretion permeates. Second, conversations are also important where the regulatory 
tasks are uncertain and ambiguous or where consensus on the definitions of issues and 
resolutions in advance provide an extensive inter-subjective ideas sharing and 
negotiations of meaning. Third, some of the regulatory techniques, such as 
proceduralization, co-regulation or meta-regulation, are based on conversations. Finally, 
the incidence and character of regulatory conversation as well as who participate in a 
process might be affected by the context in which regulations arise. However, in order 
to understand the role that regulatory conversations play, it is significant to separate 
regulatory process into components and identify when, between whom and about what 
regulatory conversations occur (Black, 2002).  
2.2.4. Jonnergård and Larsson (2007)  
Jonnergård and Larsson (2007) use the metaphor o f regulatory space in order to 
analyse the regulatory conversations which arise during the development and 
introduction of Swedish corporate governance code. Their research investigates the 
stand of the parties who submitted written comments and also what influence those 
formal responses had on the final code. Moreover, the communities of interest which 
were formed in response to the code and their influence on the composition of Swedish 
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business community change are also analysed in the study. Therefore, e xamining the 
initial proposal for the corporate governance code in Sweden, written debate which 
raises a concern regarding the referral process and later comparing this information with 
the final proposal of a code, enables the authors to draw conclusions about how 
positions of different actors in the regulatory space have changed through the process, 
where those changes have happened, how they influence the power and the stand of 
the local elite (Jonnergård & Larsson, 2007).  
According to Jonnergård and Larsson (2007), the regulatory space is the arena where 
different regulatory issues and interests are voiced and the agenda for various forms of 
regulations are set. The regulatory conversations are defined as the discursive activities 
among different participants, such as organisations, interest groups and other involved 
actors, which outline the space. Therefore, the regulatory space methodological device 
is used to identify the actors and determine issues which were most important in the 
negotiation of the code process. Moreover, the actors’ positions in the regulatory space 
were also indicated by the effect of the conversation. However, the study reveals that in 
order to understand the regulatory space division or actors influence in the referral 
process, it is significant to investigate the events which arise in the regulatory space as 
well as the advance conditions for the regulatory conversations themselves because not 
only the initiators of the conversations but also the members who participate in the 
process are essential for such understanding. The authors conclude that the metaphors 
of regulatory space as well as regulatory conversations are useful methodical devices 
which capture relevant dimensions of the regulatory process and enable to explain 
changes on the basis of internationalisation (Jonnergård & Larsson, 2007).  
2.3. Analytical Framework 
 Application of models of power and influence 
We decided to choose the one-dimensional view of power for several reasons. While we 
acknowledge that this view does not offer a complete view of influences around one 
standard but only a partial analysis as also argued by Lukes (1974), it can help us 
provide an insight into the standard-setting process. Moreover, due to the resource 
constraints we prefer to study one dimension of the influences in depth rather than give 
a complete picture which may hinder interpretation and accomplishment of our research 
purpose. Next, our paper considers an issue of the leasing standard which is about to 
be finalized, hence, we can conclude that it has not been excluded from the IASB’s 
agenda, meaning that consideration of the second dimension of power here can be 
irrelevant. 
While we use the one-dimensional view of power for identifying most successful actors 
in the standard-setting process among the chosen respondents, we incorporate various 
other theories, which add value to our analysis. In particular, we identify key actors in 
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the leasing standard-setting process by applying the model of social power of French 
and Raven (1959) specifically examining the possession of one of the following types of 
power by actors: coercive, expert and reward power. Therefore, some limitations of 
choosing the one-dimensional model are overcome by our endeavour to incorporate the 
bases of power in our study. Hence, this is our attempt to establish an interdisciplinary 
approach by converging two models of power from political science and social 
psychology.  
The one-dimensional or pluralist view of power allows us to observe participants of the 
standard-setting process by examining their policy preferences which are most clearly 
formulated in the comment letters submitted to IASB and FASB. Hence, we can see 
from this investigation whether actors initiate or veto any alternatives, which 
subsequently affect the IASB’s amended proposals. We can identify successful actors 
by analyzing initial and subsequent proposals of IASB and alternatives suggested by 
actors. Overall, our framework will let us identify which key actors are successful in 
influencing the standard-setting process and how they exercise power on the outcomes 
of the standard by either supporting alternatives or creating barriers for others. There 
are four conditions that have to be present in order to be successful in achieving our 
aim of identifying successful actors, as also distinguished by Hope and Gray (1982) 
based on Lukes (1974): first, there should be an actual decision taken, second, key 
issues should be identifiable, third, observable conflicts of opinion regarding key issues 
must exist among interested parties, and finally, interests of actors must be expressed 
as policy preferences. All these conditions are present in the case of the leasing 
standard which is illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Model of one-dimensional view of power  
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We define key actors as those that have potential power to influence the standard-
setting process and such power is considerably more than the power of others to do so. 
In this context we define power as the capacity or ability to influence and we do not 
argue that the powerful actors will definitely exercise their potential power. Therefore, 
while ‘power’ is the capacity of actors or a characteristic of them, the ‘influence’ denotes 
to the very exercise of this capacity, i.e. it is seen as an action undertaken by certain 
actors.  
The power of actors will be identified according to the model suggested by French and 
Raven (1959). As legitimate power stems from formal authority and the IASB is founded 
as an independent standard-setting organization, we think legitimate power is irrelevant 
to the purpose of our study. The referent power is about charisma and interpersonal 
skills of individuals or prestige of entities, and as such we do not think IASB tries to 
identify itself with any particular entity, as it strives to be accepted by many different 
entities; therefore, we dismiss this as irrelevant as well. We consider the three 
remaining bases of power in our thesis to identify the key actors. The expert power of 
an entity is related to skills and expertise that it can provide. The reward power includes 
material rewards and benefits. The coercive power includes the application of negative 
influences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Key Actor Identification  
In our thesis expert power will be defined as knowledge that is required by the IASB for 
their standard-setting process and would be majorly identified by the facts where IASB 
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or its affiliated bodies employ personnel from certain organizations. Hence, these 
organizations are perceived by the standard-setter to produce certain type of knowledge 
applicable to the standard-setting process and equip their personnel with such 
expertise. Reward power is attributable to those organizations that provide funds to the 
IASB (or its affiliated bodies). While conformance of IASB with any certain entity’s 
interests may not increase that entity’s future monetary contributions to IASB, it can 
meanwhile provide assurance that IASB will continually receive funds from the 
considered entity. Finally, an entity holds coercive power if it can create barriers to the 
goals of the IASB, which we conclude is IASB’s stated desire to become the global 
standard-setting body; hence, potential of creating obstacles to applicability of IFRS 
worldwide would be seen as a basis of coercive power.  
 Application of concepts of regulatory space and regulatory conversations  
In addition to the models of power and influence, in our study we explore the accounting 
standard-setting by using the lens of regulatory space, while also incorporating the tool 
of regulatory conversations. The above summaries of the regulatory space metaphor 
and regulatory conversations which are drawn from the studies of Hancher and Moran 
(1989), Young (1994), Jonnergård and Larsson (2007) and Black (2002) enable us to 
constitute the analytical framework as a foundation for our research process.  
The concept of regulatory space allows one to analyse the standard-setting process in a 
great variety of ways. For this study we select to employ several dimensions of 
regulatory space. As the historical context and particularly, the configuration of actors in 
the regulatory space at critical points in time when the regulatory activity happens are 
crucial, we will examine who controls the resources that are necessary for the 
regulatory change to take place. It will specifically be examined how resources such as 
expertise to devise rules, as well as money and people needed to enact change that are 
under control of key actors contribute to their successes in the regulatory space. The 
regulatory space is highly contested and to discern who achieves success in this 
competition, outcomes of struggles among participants on the accounting standard 
development will be explored. To better understand the regulatory space of the leasing 
standard we will not only examine specific key actors but also outline major 
relationships among these actors using network analysis techniques.  
Regulatory conversations take place among the occupants of the regulatory space that 
can affect the coordination and overall outcome of the regulatory activities. Examining 
where major regulatory conversations take place and between which actors and on 
what topics will give us an understanding of the development of the leasing standard 
and specifically, the influences that were exerted on it throughout various stages of the 
standard setting process. 
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2.4. Chapter summary  
This chapter covered the literature on the concepts of power, interests and influence as 
well as regulatory space and regulatory conversations. Firstly, three views of power 
used by Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes (2005) were explained and power bases 
of French and Raven (1959) were introduced. Regarding the regulatory space 
metaphor, we discussed Hancher and Moran’s (1989) paper as the authors shape the 
initiation and development of regulatory regimes. Next, we introduced Young (1994) 
who explains how enacting changes occur or fail to occur in a technical agenda of 
accounting project. Later, the importance of regulatory conversations is revealed by 
Black (2002) and Jonnergård and Larsson (2007). Finally, based on the literature review 
the analytical framework was developed which proposes the one-dimensional model of 
power for distinguishing influential actors complemented by the model of bases of 
power for key actor identification, which we apply throughout our thesis. The lens of 
regulatory space framework and the tool of regulatory conversations are applied during 
the analysis of the results.  
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3. Methodology  
In this chapter the methodological standpoint of our research is presented. Specifically, 
the research approach, data collection method, focus areas and respondents’ selection 
process are explained in detail. In addition, content analysis as our research technique, 
coding process for comment letters, and the one-dimensional model application are 
defined which serve as a basis for performing the research analysis. Lastly, some 
issues regarding reliability and validity, as well as the ethical considerations are outlined 
as integral parts of research.  
3.1. Research Approach 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an insight into political processes on changing of 
the leasing accounting standard. In order to accomplish this purpose a qualitative 
research strategy has been chosen which we believe is an appropriate approach for 
answering our research questions. Our choice is due to the fact that the qualitative 
research is preoccupied with exploring phenomena (Creswell, 2009). It is concerned 
with understanding of words rather than quantification of data (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
The interpretivist property of qualitative research focuses on the understanding of the 
social world by examining how its participants interpret that world, which we also strive 
to achieve by this research.  
This study takes an inductive view characteristic of a qualitative approach as it strives to 
understand the nature of standard setting by exploring the phenomenon of regulatory 
space participants’ influences on the development of the leasing accounting standard  
(Saunders et al. 2009). Therefore, we are especially concerned with the context in 
which changes to the leasing standard take place. In particular, the broad lens of 
chosen theoretical framework of regulatory space provides us with a set of dimensions 
with which to explore this context, such as examining resources held by regulatory 
space participants, organizational relationships, etc. The concept of regulatory space 
further assists us in the analysis of the empirical data. The data is gathered through a 
document study which includes on the one hand, comment letters sent to the standard 
setters and on the other hand, various research studies, publications, agenda papers 
and website information. 
To answer our research question, we turn our attention to the context where the IASB is 
set in, first describing the structure of the standard setter and then following French and 
Raven’s (1959) power model in order to distinguish key players in the international 
accounting regulation process which in turn will lead us to identify which actors can 
have influence on the standard setting process due to the institutional context. We also 
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investigate the organizational relationships and employment interactions among IASB 
and identified key actors. Finally, we focus on the technical issues of the standard 
themselves to identify changes made over different stages of the due process by the 
IASB and the reactions and criticisms of respondents. In dealing with these regulatory 
conversations, we compare the comment letters to IASB’s proposals and examine if 
certain actors’ views have affected the dynamics in the standard setters’ proposals and 
have been incorporated in proposal updates, which would be an indication of 
participants’ influences over the IASB. For this we use a method of content analysis 
which will be explained later in this chapter. 
For the intended analysis, we have carried out a document study of official documents 
of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources analyzed by us include the official 
publications of the IASB regarding the leasing standard and their project updates, 
meeting minutes, agenda papers and comment letters sent by respondents in the due 
process, as well as the annual reports for key actor identification with reward power. 
Comment letters can be regarded as our primary sources since they convey public 
opinions of many different participants which are the object of our study. Secondary 
sources include reports from organizations, journal articles as well as news articles for 
the discussion of the institutional context around the lease standard. 
We have chosen to focus on the formal means of influences that we perceive comment 
letters represent. We are aware that constituents are also able to influence the standard 
setter by the means other than comment letters, as claimed by MacArthur (1988). 
However, comment letters still represent an essential way of formal participation in the 
due process, since the IASB strives to emphasize its transparent standard-setting 
process. In addition, Georgiou (2004) claims that those corporate actors that submit 
comment letters are also more likely to use other means of exerting influence on the 
Board than those that do not, such as private meetings with the standard setter.  
3.2. Research Strategy 
This section identifies how the chosen theoretical framework is linked with the selected 
methodology and gives an overall direction for this paper. As explained in Chapter 2, for 
the first part of our research question we use French and Raven’s (1959) model and for 
the second part of our research question we apply the one-dimensional model of power. 
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Figure 3. Research Strategy 
As seen from Figure 3, section 3.4 of methodology chapter explains how the power 
sources model becomes operationalised in this study, for which empirical findings 
through application of the adopted method are presented later in Chapter 4. Similarly, 
the application of one-dimensional model of power is discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.6 
of this chapter. As one part of this model deals with actual decisions of the IASB, these 
are explored in Chapter 5, the method for which is given in section 3.5. The remaining 
part of the power model deals with policy preferences of respondents, which is 
discussed in Chapter 6, the research method for which is presented in 3.6. Lastly, 
empirical results from these chapters are analysed. 
3.3. Data Collection 
The Case of the Lease Standard. For discussing the proposed standard and specific 
focus areas, as well as changes in them, we examined the following documents from 
the IASB: (1) Discussion Paper (DP); (2) Exposure Draft (ED); (3) Re-Exposure Draft 
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(Re-ED); (4) Project Updates after Re-ED; (5) other IASB staff papers regarding the 
standard changes. 
Institutional context. For outlining the institutional context of the IASB, we conducted the 
following search: (1) examined the annual reports of IFRS Foundation for the years 
2009-2014 to identify the reward power held by external stakeholders; (2) examined the 
website of the IFRS Foundation and the IASB in order to identify expert power by 
exploring the employment ties of IASB/ its affiliated bodies (e.g. IFRS IC, IFRS AC, etc.) 
and external stakeholders; (3) examined prior literature to identify bodies with coercive 
power over IASB (4) examined the websites of key actors to identify organizational 
relationships among them (e.g. Monitoring Board’s relationships with other key actors), 
as well as employment interactions between key actors. The above steps 1-3 allow us 
to arrive at conclusions regarding which organizations could be distinguished as key 
actors based on the analytical framework which was explained in Chapter 2. For the 
description of the key actors we examined the websites of these actors as well as prior 
literature on their relationship with IASB.  
Comment Letters. As for the potential influences from selected participants, we examine 
comment letters, the strategy of which is explored in sections 3.5 and 3.6.  
3.4. Selection of Respondents  
As outlined in theoretical framework in Chapter 2, we use French and Raven’s (1959) 
model for key actor identification. We distinguish actors holding coercive, reward and/or 
expert power. As a result of this analysis which is discussed further in Chapter 4, we 
identify 25 key actors. Next, we consider these actors’ submitted comment letters to the 
stages of DP, ED and Re-ED. The comment letters were retrieved from the IASB and 
FASB websites under the lease project webpage. The total number of CLs received (i.e. 
‘population’) for the DP was equal to 303, while for the ED and Re-ED 786 and 655 
respectively. The examination of submissions outlines that some of the selected key 
actors did not participate in the due process, while others participated only in some  
stages of it. In total 18 out of 25 actors engaged in the due process by sending 
comment letters, which formed our sample of 57 comment letters. We only consider 
organizations as key actors and exclude individuals as the group that is least expected 
to influence the standard setting process because of the fact that they are not affi liated 
with organizations that are seen as major change drivers by Hancher and Moran (1989).  
 Key actors with coercive power 
To identify the key players with coercive power on the IASB standard-setting process, 
we examined the prior literature (see: Alali & Cao, 2010; Manh, 2011; Zeff, 2012). For 
the literature search we used Business Source Complete, Google Scholar and Google 
Search with keywords such as ‘ IASB’ AND ‘influence’ OR ‘key players’.  
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 Key actors with reward power 
In order to identify the key actors with reward power, we investigated the IASB’s biggest 
financial supporters. By doing this, we looked at the IFRS Foundation annual reports for 
the years 2009 – 2014 and selected organizations which have funded IASB more than £ 
500,000 during those particular years. This amount was chosen because there was a 
big gap between other amounts, as the next category started only from £100,000. 
Moreover, the financial supporters who paid more than £ 500,000 compose from 61% to 
75% of total contribution for IASB. 
 Key actors with reward power 
In order to identify key actors with experience power, we used network analysis 
technique based on employment ties (Perry & Nöelke, 2005). Firstly, we collected the 
data on IASB and its committees, as well as leases accounting working group 
employers, due to the fact that they are important in the standard-setting process as it is 
later dealt with in section 5.1.2.This data was gathered from the IFRS Foundation and 
the IASB website. From the data we identified two types of employees: (1) those who 
work in committees or leases accounting working group on a part time bases and at the 
same time represent their organizations; (2) those who work in IASB on full-time bases, 
besides three possible employees which might be part-time members. Therefore, those 
members who are permanent IASB employees and do not present other organization 
we classified according to the former employers, where they worked most recently 
before joining the IASB. 
3.5. Focus Areas 
The most significant alteration in the lease standard is the accounting model itself. The 
standard modification includes changes for both lessee and lessor accounting. 
However, as the changes have been referred to stem from the dissatisfaction with the 
lessee accounting due to its division into finance and operating leases and as the 
proposed right-of-use (ROU) model abolishing this distinction has become the most 
contradictory topic within the due process of IASB, we focus our research solely on the 
topic of lessee accounting. The proposed standard, as any other international 
accounting standard issued by IASB, consists of major components including the overall 
ROU model itself followed by topics of scope exclusions, lease term, recognition, 
measurement, presentation and disclosures. To answer the research question posed by 
this study we have concluded that it is crucial to consider several key issues within the 
standard which have been regarded critical by constituents of the standard setting 
process. Therefore, we have undertaken the following analysis:  
1)  We examined the Invitation to Comment section of each DP, ED and Re-ED where 
the IASB seeked response and we identified all key topics in the standard that were 
open for public comment and noted the changes made by the IASB from the point of the 
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Discussion Paper until now. We think that changes on certain topics might infer a 
variety of different opinions among stakeholders.  
2)  We also reviewed IASB agenda papers, audio recordings and project updates to see 
the emphasis made by the standard setter on crucial topics.  
3)  Further, we reviewed a sample of comment letters from various types of respondents 
(e.g. preparers, profession, standard-setters, etc.) to identify whether our general 
impressions regarding the criticality of issues coincided with the interpretations of those 
topics made by respondents and their general attitudes towards those areas. In 
comment letters the respondents give answers to questions posed by the IASB as well 
as provide an introductory section where they summarise their position and emphasize 
the points important to them. The inclusion of a topic in the introductory section hence 
was one of the indicators of importance and the frequency it appeared in such sections 
in comment letters was assumed to be positively related to the increasing significance 
to stakeholders. In addition, we also examined the content by assessing the level of 
concerns constituents had regarding specific topics and have also drawn conclusions 
based on it.  
4)  Moreover, in addition to the above the key issues had to satisfy the following criteria: 
the proposed key issue had to be material, specifically, it had to have a significant 
impact on the financial position and/or performance of the preparers compared to the 
one(s) required by the previous standard IAS 17.  
Based on the above analysis, we strived to capture the most critical issues to the 
constituents of the due process, where it is possible to see the conflict of opinions as 
well as expect the actors to try to influence the standard-setter the most.  
We have identified that the overall ROU model received most letters from respondents, 
though they were also further commenting on the issues they were mostly concerned 
with. We have seen that there are differences among various stakeholders; however, 
some patterns can also be identified. In addition to the ROU model, most stakeholders 
are concerned with the identification of the lease term. Moreover, many respondents are 
worried about scope exclusions available for short-term leases. While these topics have 
been present for all stages of the due process, the dual accounting model appeared 
only in the Re-ED of 2013, which sparked great interest as well as harsh criticisms. 
Therefore, we decided that this topic was also worthy of our consideration and could 
lead us to interesting insight. Hence, we have defined our four focus areas:  
(1) ROU model; 
(2) Lease term; 
(3) Short-term leases; 
(4) Dual accounting model. 
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All key issues identified in the standard from which we have made a selection are 
represented in Appendix C. While we have made a careful selection of the focus areas, 
we are aware that other important topics have also attracted senders ’ attention, among 
which we have seen the topic of disclosures, impairment, transition, definition of leases, 
etc., however, we have decided to limit our scope to the above four issues in order to be 
able to investigate the issues at the desired level of detail. The above topics and their 
relevance will be further explored in Chapter 5. 
3.6. Content Analysis 
Content analysis, as a research method, is chosen in order to examine comment letters 
which were submitted to the IASB and FASB in response to the leases discussion 
papers. According to Krippendorff (2004, p.18), it is a commonly undertaken “research 
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful 
matter) to the contexts of their use”. Content analysis is particularly useful for 
categorizing items from the text and it is suitable for a large amount of qualitative data 
analysis (Holsti, 1969). It also allows the examiner to discover and describe the focus of 
individual, group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990). Moreover, content 
analysis is a systematic study and it has structured forms that enable the researcher to 
extract relevant information more consistently than the same document could be read 
only casually (GAO, 1996). However, this type of analysis requires an enormous 
amount of work and time in order to develop a coding system which ensures 
reproducibility and reliability (Yen, Hirst & Hopkins, 2007). 
In the previous studies, content analysis has also been considered as a well-established 
method for analyzing comment letters as the means of communication between 
different actors in the standard-setting process (Tutticci, Dunstan & Holmes, 1994; Yen 
et al. 2007; Chatham, Larson & Vietze, 2010; Schultz & Hollister, 2011; Holder et al. 
2013). There are two generic approaches to content analysis: first, quantitative or ‘form-
oriented’ analysis which focuses on word counts or similar measures; second, 
qualitative or ‘meaning-oriented’ analysis which involves investigations on the meaning 
of text. Form-oriented analysis is seen as more objective while meaning-oriented 
analysis can provide in-depth insights into the analysed text. (Smith & Taffler, 2000; Yen 
et al. 2007). This thesis is based on qualitative or ‘meaning-oriented’ approach of 
content analysis as we analyse the respondents’ opinions and arguments for or against 
proposed changes on leases standard. 
The process of content analysis is classified as computer-aided or human-coded 
(Beattie, Mclnnes & Fearnley, 2004). Computers have been always considered as 
reliable, processing large volumes of data at high speed and eager to code it easily 
Krippendorff (2004). However, according to Krippendorff (2004), it is misleading to think 
that computers are able to read text and interpret it correctly. Computers can only 
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identify character strings while literate humans are proficient at understanding complex 
expressions in the reading text (Krippendorff, 2004). Therefore, this paper uses human-
coded process as it makes the quantitative measurement more reliable which is 
especially important in order to ensure that different respondents' comment letters are 
coded in the same way. 
Several steps have been taken in order to develop an appropriate method to this paper. 
First, by reading DP, ED, Re-ED and project updates the overall understanding of 
IASB’s and FASB’s proposals during the different stages of leases project was gained. 
We also tried to perceive which proposals for the same issues have changed over time 
and which were incorporated into the agenda only temporally. Subsequently, several 
comment letters were picked and thoroughly read in order to make a list of important 
topics. The length of the written comments varied from 1 to 46 pages which implies that 
significant issues and the depth of issues discussed depends on different respondents. 
The questions that reached the highest concern of respondents were finally determined 
after comparing and identifying significant topics in the comment letters, the Boards’ 
proposal papers and feedback papers received on the proposals. For each focus area 
we identified separate categories which usually gave information whether respondents 
agreed or disagreed with suggestions, also for some focus areas some new categories 
were drawn from the participants’ responses that identify the alternative solutions that 
respondents were supportive of or the reasons for which respondents disagreed with 
the suggested methods. The categories in which we coded the responses were refined 
throughout the research process. Our qualitative research studies were drawn on the 
principles of template analysis in an Excel spreadsheet which made the complex and 
large data coding process more manageable (Cassell, 2008).  
3.6.1. Coding process 
We consider the coding process as a two-step method: first, we identify the 
respondent’s overall position towards the topic, and then, we identify alternatives 
proposed by them. Wherever needed we also identify key actors’ arguments used for 
agreeing/ disagreeing with the IASB and the link established with the Conceptual 
Framework (CF), which also is revealed in the manner shown below.  
Hence we can see that the OIC is ‘strongly opposed’ to the inclusion of options in the 
lease term (hence, position). The OIC suggests that the contractual term should be 
used as the lease term and the options should not be included (hence, alternative). The 
OIC claims that inclusion of options in the lease term is against the Conceptual 
Framework (hence, argument). OIC argues that this change would result in reduction in 
comparability (hence, link to Conceptual Framework).  
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Position 
Argument 
Alternative 
Link to CF 
Question 8: Lease term.  Do you agree that a lessee or a lessor should determine 
the lease term as the longest possible term that is more likely than not to occur 
taking into account the effect of any options to extend or terminate the lease? 
Why or why not? If not, how do you propose that a lessee or a lessor should 
determine the lease term and why? 
“The OIC believes that the determination of the lease term should be based on the 
rights that the lessee holds on the basis of the contractual conditions and/or the 
law and not defined on the basis of the likelihood of exercising the renewal 
options. 
The OIC does not agree with the proposal of the IASB to consider in the estimate of 
the lease term the options for renewal or termination and, consequently, to 
include in the value of the liability (lessee) or the asset (lessor) the amounts 
payable or receivable stemming from the lease renewal options. 
To do so would run counter to the current definitions of liability and asset 
contained in the Framework, as: a) the lessee does not have an unconditional 
obligation to make the payments in the period of extension until the renewal 
option is exercised; and b) the lessor has neither an unconditional right to receive  
nor the control of the lease payments in the extension period until the lessee 
exercises the option… 
…Last, it should be noted that taking account of the renewal options would cause 
a significant increase in the volatility in the accounting results as well as a 
reduction in comparability among entities operating in the same conditions with 
similar lease contracts” (OIC, 2010).     
 
Figure 4. Example of coding process 
3.6.2. Application of one-dimensional model of power 
As explained in Chapter 2, one-dimensional model offers a framework of identifying 
successes and influences in the standard-setting process. Influences are identified in 
two major ways: first, disagreement of a key actor on a specific topic which is followed 
by the modified proposal is seen as an influence or a ‘success’ (e.g. actor X disagrees 
on topic Y in the DP and it is changed in the ED stage), and similarly agreement of a 
key actor on a specific topic which remains in the subsequent draft standard is also 
seen as an influence (e.g. actor X agrees on topic Y in the DP and it is not changed in 
the ED stage); second, if an alternative suggested by a key actor is incorporated in the 
subsequent proposal, this is identified as an influence (e.g. actor X proposes alternative 
Y after the DP which is later proposed on the ED stage by the IASB). For illustrating the 
degree of influence, when at one stage actor is influential by disagreeing/agreeing on a 
certain topic, it is given a score of 1. However, when acto r’s proposal is incorporated in 
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the standard, a score of 2 is given (e.g. one point for disagreement and an additional 
point for having a successful proposal). When actors partially disagree with the proposal 
which is later changed (similarly, regarding agreement related to no subsequent 
change), only score of 0.5 is given, since such actors were not strongly opposed to the 
topic in question. In situations where the actor does not influence a topic, does not 
submit a comment letter or does not express an opinion about specific topic, a score of 
0 is assigned. The larger the number of the scores, the more influential the actor is.  
Table 1. Coding System 
CASES POINTS 
a.  Actor disagrees with the current standard policy and their proposal is 
incorporated in the subsequent DP 
2 
b.  Actor disagrees with IASB proposal which is later changed but not in 
the direction favoured by the actor 
1 
c.  Actor agrees with a proposal and it is not modified at the next stage 1 
d.  Actor only expresses partial disagreement or agreement and the 
situation in cases b or c correspondingly is repeated   
0.5 
e.  Actor's opinion does not influence the direction of the standard 
changes 
0 
f.  Actor does not submit a comment letter or does not express an 
opinion 
0 
3.7. Reliability and Validity 
In order to make valid inferences from this study, particular emphasis on research 
reliability and validity should be paid. Reliability is defined as the degree to which data 
collection methods or analysis procedures can provide consistent results (Saunders et 
al. 2009). In other words, the research is considered to be reliable if another observer 
with the same methods and data set would come to similar conclusions (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003). Thus, we have identified a few threats to our research quality. One of 
them is observers’ error which means that the same text or data might be coded 
differently by various researchers (Saunders et al. 2009). In order to avoid this threat, 
we checked the data for obvious mistakes as well as used cross-check coding method 
by comparing results that were independently derived by each of us (CTRL, 2011). All 
the important questions which arose during the individual work process were solved 
together after discussing them and coming to the same solutions. Moreover, according 
to Saunders et al. (2009), the reliability is easier assessed when the clear clarifications 
of the research process are made. Therefore, we included thorough explanations of 
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how we used our chosen one-dimensional power and regulatory space analytical 
framework, how our empirical data was collected and coded, and how sample 
selections were made. All our findings and interpretations are theoretically driven that 
we believe also enhance the credibility of this study.  Finally, observers’ biases might 
have also been presented through the interpretation and coding the text process 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Cross-checking method can mitigate but not fully eliminate this 
threat. 
The validity of findings or data helps to provide compelling reasons for approaching the 
research results with serious consideration. With this in mind, validity is understood as 
quality of research outcomes which leads one to believe them as true when one has in 
mind the real world of people, phenomena, events, experience and actions 
(Krippendorff, 2004). It is frequently explained through the concept of two distinct 
dimensions. The first, identified as internal validity, raises an issue to which degree the 
findings can be attributed to treatment and the second, known as external validity, 
concerned with the generalizability of the results (Ali & Yusof, 2011). Therefore, to 
achieve internal validity, the key actors’ identification process is based on the French 
and Raven’s (1959) power model and therefore, systematic and consistent treatment of 
data is achieved Moreover, the primary source of data, such as annual reports, as well 
as companies’ web pages with information about their board structure and employees, 
academic articles as secondary data are systematically examined and applied to 
support the power model. The coding process is thoroughly presented and examples of 
it provided. In addition, we have not had any previous experience regarding the 
standard-setting process and any significant relationships with identified key players. 
Therefore, the risk of bias and subjective illustration of particular actors’ influences on 
the IASB structure and due process, does not exist. As a result, we believe that these 
data presents a truthful picture of reality and the internal validity is considered to be 
relatively high.  
As for external validity the part of our research which draws conclusions regarding the 
key actors in the IASB’s standard-setting process could be generalizable to the IASB’s 
other standard-setting processes, as the French and Raven’s (1959) model could be 
applied with similar success. As for the identification of i nfluences of these key actors, 
since the analysis did not use any statistical sampling forms we do not consider it 
appropriate to generalize the findings to other settings. Moreover, since this study is 
based on the case of particular leases standard, we are aware that interests, resources 
held and configuration of actors can vary for different standards. Therefore, our thesis 
strives to provide insight into the standard-setting process of the IASB based on a 
particular case rather than aim for generalizable findings.  
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3.8. Ethical Considerations 
During the whole research process the ethical considerations have been taken into 
account in order to conduct and present this study in an ethical and social moral 
manner. The stance of universalism was taken on the issues, which suggests that 
ethical rules should never be broken (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
Ethics, in the context of research, points out to the suitability of the researcher’s 
behavior in connection with the rights of those who become the focus of their work and 
might be affected by it (Saunders et al. 2009). However, this is not immediately 
concerned to our research as it is based on the written comment letters which are 
electronically submitted to the www.ifrs.org website and therefore, we did not have a 
direct connection with respondents which could influence their answers. All responses 
are put on the public record and posted on the website by the IASB and the IFRS 
Foundation, unless the respondents asked for confidentiality. Although, it is not common 
to grant confidentiality for respondents and it is only supported by good reason, such as 
commercial confidence (IFRS Foundation, 2013). This implies that we do not have to 
deal with the issue of data confidentiality and anonymity which according to Bryman and 
Bell (2011) raises particular difficulties for many forms of qualitative studies. 
Additionally, there is no issue of lack of informed consent, as all respondents were 
aware that by sending comment letters their opinions would become public and could 
potentially be used for research or other purposes (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Another 
important ethical principle which has to be considered is the maintenance of objectivity 
and quality during the process of data collection. Objectivity is vital in the analysis stage 
to make sure that we do not misrepresent the data (Saunders et al. 2009). Therefore, in 
order to investigate respondents’ attitude and position towards the new leases standard 
and chosen focus areas, the responses were read thoroughly to gain an overall 
perception instead of searching only the key words and making conclusions from them. 
However, some extent of subjectivity might still exist which might affect the process of 
drawing the conclusions. 
3.9. Chapter Summary 
This chapter briefly explained the qualitative research strategy of this thesis and 
indicated the guidelines how the research question will be analysed in further chapters. 
The methods regarding the data collection, as well as selection of respondents and 
focus areas were presented. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of content 
analysis were identified and coding process was clarified. In addition, it was also 
explained how the one-dimensional model is applied in key actor identification process. 
Finally, reliability, validity and ethical considerations were presented.  
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4. Institutional Context  
The following chapter provides the necessary context on the institutional set-up of the 
IASB, as well as the background on the process of standard setting. It is also identifies 
who the key actors on the bases of power model are and how they influence the IASB 
within its structure and standard-setting process. Moreover, a few most powerful actors 
are introduced, as we believe that they frame our regulatory space. Finally, in order to 
show that leases accounting standard is not developed in a vacuum, organizational 
relationships and employment interactions among IASB and its key actors is presented.  
4.1. The IASB Background 
The current standard setting body in Europe is the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) which replaced its former body, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) in 2001 (Brackney & Witmer, 2005). It is an independent authority 
that develops, approves and publishes International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). The Board currently has 14 experts who represent the best available 
combination of technical proficiency and diversity of international business and market 
experience, as well as essential knowledge in auditing or accounting education, and in 
preparing or setting accounting standards (Deloitte, 2015a). In order to ensure the 
political and technical credibility of an international standard -setter, including the 
acceptability of its standards, the IASB members are elected from different geographical 
areas (Nobes & Parker, 2012). All its meetings are held in public and webcasts. 
Moreover, the IASB follows a systematic, open and transparent process where the 
publication of consultative documents for public comment is a vital component. 
Therefore, to fulfill the standard-setting duties and understand the community need, the 
Board closely collaborates with stakeholders around the world, such as investors, 
analysts, controllers, business leaders, accounting standard-setters and the 
accountancy profession (IFRS, 2015a). However, while the IASB is responsible for 
standards development that could be adopted on a global basis, to achieve this 
objective it heavily relies on the help from the United States and the European Union. Its 
dependence on these two key players is evident from their participation in oversight and 
standards-setting bodies (Brackney & Witmer, 2005). Therefore, in order to understand 
how these all actors influence the standard setting process, first the institutional set-up 
of the IASB and due process is presented. 
4.1.1. The IASB Organizational Structure 
The IASB is headed by the IFRS Foundation which is a non-for-profit corporation 
created under the US law. The IFRS Foundation is controlled by 22 trustees, who have 
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undertaken to operate in the public interest. The main objective of the IFRS Foundation 
is to develop an understandable, single set of high quality, enforceable and globally 
accepted financial reporting standards which are based on clearly articulated principles 
(Deloitte, 2015b). Another important body is the Monitoring Board, which was formed in 
order to enhance the trustees’ accountability for public. Its members initially comprise of 
the leading figures from the EU Commission, SEC, Japan’s Financial Services Agency 
and IOSCO (Nobes & Parker, 2012). Moreover, the Brazilian Securities Commission 
(CVM), Financial Services Commission (FSC) of South Korea and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) also participate in the Board meetings although, only 
as non-voting observers. The Monitoring Board formally interacts between capital 
markets authorities and the IFRS Foundation which allows successfully discharge their 
mandates relating to market integrity, investor protection and capital formation (Deloitte, 
2015c). Further, there are two more essential bodies in the IASB structure. One of them 
is the IFRS Interpretations Committee which provides timely guidance on financial 
reporting questions and publishes the interpretations of existing standards which first 
have to be approved by the IASB. Its members are appointed by the IFRS Foundation 
Trustees. Another important body is the IFRS Advisory Council which consists of 
analysts, preparers, auditors and other experts who advise the IASB on its agenda 
decisions and project’s priorities. Its members are also selected by the IFRS Foundation 
Trustees for a renewable term (Nobes & Parker, 2012). In addition, it is common for the 
IASB to form a consultative group of experts, in order to give recommendation on the 
major standard developments, such as the leases accounting working group. However, 
the members of advisory group act in their personal capacity and are not appointed to 
become as representatives of any group. Their role is only advisory and they do not 
attempt to find generally acceptable solutions (Appendix A) (Deloitte, 2015d). 
4.1.2. IASB Standard-setting Process 
The IASB develops the high quality global accounting standards via an international 
consultation process called the “due process” (IFRS, 2015b). There are a few principles 
which must be followed during the standard-setting: transparency, full and fair 
consultation, and accountability. The IASB and IFRS Interpretation Committee always 
perform their procedures over and above those principles, in order to improve their 
consultation and operation (IFRS, 2013a). There are six formal stages in due process 
which are followed during the leases standard development process1:  
Agenda setting. In order to add potential items into the agenda, the IASB considers: 
whether the project would be relevant to users and the information’s reliability could be 
                                                 
1
 It is worth pointing out that during the period of 2012-2013, a number of changes were made to the Due 
Process Handbook, such as the research process has occurred before agenda setting step (Deloitte, 
2015f). However, our period of study 2009 – 2014 which consisted, and it still does according to the IFRS 
Foundation webpage – of six identifiable stages.  
Jamburia & Lankevičiūtė (2015). Political Influences on the IASB Accounting Standard-Setting: The Case of the Leases Standard 
32 
 
provided; whether or not any guidance is obtainable; the opportunity to strengthen 
convergence; the worthiness of the standard if they be developed; and resource 
constraints. All discussions and decisions regarding the potential projects are held in the 
public IASB meetings. Before the decision is accepted, the IASB consults with the IFRS 
Advisory Council and other standard-setting bodies on proposed agenda items and its 
priorities. To approve agenda and sufficient priority of items, a simple majority of votes 
during the IASB meeting is required (IFRS, 2015c). 
Project planning. After agenda is formulated and most important issues are known, the 
IASB makes a decision whether to pursue the project alone or in collaboration with 
another standard-setter. Moreover, at this stage a consultative group, such as Leases 
Accounting Working Group, might also be established. The team must be represented 
by the two most senior technical staff members and may also include various members 
of staff from other accounting standard-setters. The working group consults the IASB 
staff until a project is complete (IFRS, 2015d). 
Discussion paper’s (DP) development and publication. Although, this stage is not 
mandatory in the standard-setting process, the IASB usually issues a discussion paper 
as “a vehicle to explain the issue and solicit early comment from constituents” (IFRS, 
2010, p.9). The paper includes an in-depth insight into the issues, potential approaches, 
the IASB’s or issues’ authors’ positions, as well as an invitation to public comment 
(IFRS, 2015e). When the commenting period ends, the project team prepares comment 
letters for the IASB’s consideration. In addition, all comment letters and a summary of 
the comments are posted on the website. If the IASB makes a decision to investigate 
the issue further, it might arrange public hearings or round table meetings, in order to 
receive more comments and suggestions for conducting issues (IFRS, 2010).  
Exposure draft’s (ED) development and publication. Irrespective of whether a 
discussion paper has been published by the IASB, an exposure draft is a mandatory 
phase in the due process. The development of an exposure draft starts with the 
consideration of issues on the basis of research and recommendations which the 
project team prepared for the IASB, received comments on discussion paper, as well as 
the proposals made by the IFRS Advisory Council, consultative group, various 
accounting standard-setters and suggestions which arose during the public education 
sessions. When all issues are resolved, the IASB’s staff starts drafting an exposure 
draft to be voted upon. After completing the draft and voting on it, the IASB publishes 
paper for one more public comment (IFRS, 2015f). 
IFRS development and publication. After an exposure draft’s comments are considered 
by the IASB, the development of IFRS is performed and all changes are posted on the 
website. However, revised issues may prompt that the IASB needs to expose its revised 
proposals for public comment and issue re-exposure draft. If it is decided that the re-
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exposure is essential, the standard setting procedures are similar to the first exposure 
draft (IFRS, 2015g). 
Although, if the IASB determines that the exposure draft’s issues have reached a 
conclusion, it informs the staff to draft the IFRS. Finally, the IFRS is published, when the 
standard-setting process is completed and all issues are solved, the IFRS Interpretation 
Committee reviewed the draft and the IASB members voted in favor of publication 
(IFRS, 2010). 
Actions after IFRS is issued. After the standard’s publication, the IASB and its staff 
organise regular meetings with all parties who are interested in helping to understand 
unforeseen problems which are related to the practical implementation and potential 
impact of its proposals. In addition, in order to guarantee consistency in the application 
of IFRS, the IFRS Foundation also stimulates educational activities (IFRS, 2015h).  
 
Figure 5. Timeline of leases project in the due process 
According to the Alali and Cao’s (2010) presupposition, the structure and due process 
of the IASB are designed in order to safeguard the IASB’s members and the standard 
setting process from political influence. However, it is a difficult task to set the global 
standards and at the same time meet all different stakeholders’ expectations (Alali & 
Cao, 2010). The following sections disclose how the IASB has been vulnerable to 
influences from different actors across and within its structure and standard-setting 
process. 
4.2. Key actor identification 
After outlining the main governance structure of IASB, we further explore the 
involvement of international bodies in the standard-setting process overall, as well as 
based on the specific case of leasing. 
 Key actors with coercive power 
Through the process which was identified in Chapter 3, three key actors who exert 
power on the IASB were identified: the European Commission, US SEC and IOSCO. 
This implies that, if one of these regulators is not satisfied with the proposed standard, 
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one may reject to use it in its member states. All these regulators are discussed 
separately in the following sections 4.2.1.− 4.2.3. 
Table 2. Key actors with coercive power 
 
   Key actors with reward power 
The reward method is based on the notion that power gives other people what they 
want, and for this reason ask them to do something for you in exchange (French & 
Raven, 1959). Through the key actor identification process 13 powerful players which 
contribute to the IASB’s foundation were identified. 
Table 3. Key actors with reward power 
 
 Key actors with expert power 
As it was mentioned in our power theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the expert power 
is defined as knowledge and skills that someone requires. In our case, it is the IASB or 
its affiliated bodies’ employees who present particular organizations. Therefore, in order 
to identify key actors with expert power, we used network analysis technique based on 
employment ties (Perry & Nöelke, 2005). 
The result of data collection identified 145 different private and public sector 
organizations with 179 employees on IASB, its committees and leases accounting 
INSTITUTION COERCIVE POWER
European Commission Ability to restrict IFRS application throughout the EU
US SEC Ability to restrict IFRS application in the US
IOSCO Ability to restrict IFRS application on international stock markets
CATEGORY TITLE TYPE 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
European Union European Commission (EC) Regulator 3.077.672£     3.461.965£       3.335.291£     3.653.314£      - -
United States Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) Standard-setter 1.839.231£     - - 300.000£         - -
Japan Financial Accounting Standards Foundation (FASF) Standard-setter 1.709.436£     1.784.896£       1.739.277£     1.712.869£      1.850.029£     1.736.875£    
Deloitte Touche Accounting Firm 1.640.000£     1.650.000£       1.478.000£     1.478.000£      1.300.000£     1.300.000£    
PricewaterhouseCoopers* Accounting Firm 1.640.000£     1.650.000£       1.478.000£     1.478.000£      1.300.000£     1.300.000£    
Ernst & Young* Accounting Firm 1.640.000£     1.650.000£       1.478.000£     1.478.000£      1.300.000£     1.300.000£    
KPMG* Accounting Firm 1.640.000£     1.650.000£       1.478.000£     1.478.000£      1.300.000£     1.300.000£    
United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Standard-setter 862.717£        900.000£          939.270£        860.730£         855.000£        800.000£       
France French Ministry of Finance (ANC) Standard-setter 792.016£        832.154£          810.504£        853.679£         860.733£        888.099£       
Italia Organismo Italiano di Contabilità (OIC) Standard-setter 594.012£        633.010£          600.593£        661.117£         628.246£        683.683£       
Australia Financial Reporting Council (FRC)* Standard-setter 535.743£        660.676£          644.012£        607.467£         591.993£        438.009£       
Russia Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation Standard-setter 505.781£        356.817£         300.000£       - - 18.203£         
Canada Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada* Profession 444.377£       522.884£          549.029£        481.760£         487.310£        402.946£       
16.920.985£   15.752.402£     14.829.976£   15.042.936£    10.473.311£   10.167.815£  
22.591.000£   21.372.000£     20.030.000£   20.562.000£    16.640.000£   16.584.000£  
75% 74% 74% 73% 63% 61%
International 
Accounting 
Firms
Total Contribution
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION received by IFRS Foundation (million)**
Share of selected actors' contributions in total contributions 
*amounts translated from USD into GBP based on 7 May, 2015
** all organisations are included
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working group. However, we took cut-off of 1 employee tie from the organization and 
considered only those organizations that have at least two ties to IASB or its affi liated 
bodies, as we believe that there can always be one member who is chosen from a 
random company. This reduced the number of organizations to 17, which represent the 
core of the IASB and its committees, as well as leases accounting working group 
network. 
Table 4. Key actors with expert power2 
 
 
As a result, French and Raven’s (1959) power model helped us to identify 25 key actors 
who have potential authority to influence the IASB standard-setting process. These all 
actors are presented in Table 4 and Appendix B which provides a brief overview of the 
organizations’ members and their missions, as well as their connection or interests 
regarding change of the leases accounting standard. While some of the organizations 
are presented briefly, few of them are discussed thoroughly in the next sections.  
          
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The Group of European national standard-setters which is composed of representatives f rom France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are seen as one organization. Group of European national 
standard-setters consists of UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC), French Ministry of Finance (ANC), 
Organismo Italiano di Contabilità (Italy) (OIC) and Accounting Standards Committee Germany (ASCG).  
INSTITUTION
TOTAL 
NO. OF 
TIES IA
SB
IF
RS
 A
C
IF
RS
 Fo
un
d.
IF
RS
 IC
IF
RS
 M
B
Le
as
es
 W
G
1 IOSCO 8 2 3 2 1
2 CFA Institute 4 1 1 1 1
3 Deloitte Touche 3 1 1 1
4 Ernst & Young 3 1 1 1
5
Group of European national standard-setters (FR, 
Germ, Italy, UK)*
3 3
6 KPMG 3 1 1 1
7 PricewaterhouseCoopers 3 1 1 1
8 SEC (US) 3 1 1 1
9 AngloGold Ashanti 2 1 1
10 Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) 2 1 1
11 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2 1 1
12 EC (EFRAG) 2 1 1
13 Financial Executives International (FEI) 2 1 1
14 Grant Thornton 2 1 1
15 Japan Financial Services Agency 2 1 1
16 Korea Accounting Standards Board (KASB) 2 1 1
17 Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) 2 1 1
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 Table 5. Key players in the IASB standard-setting process 
 
The authorities presented with asterisks in Table 5 are not always the same as they 
were defined during the key actor identification process. Firstly, EFRAG is used instead 
of the EC, due to the fact that it advises the EC on all the IFRS questions (see section 
5.3.1). Secondly, Financial Accounting Standards Foundation (FASF) of Japan was 
replaced by the Accounting Standard Board of Japan (ASBJ), because it is a main 
organisation within the FASF which is directly accountable for the accounting standards 
development and deliberation, as well as it contributes to the international accounting 
standards improvement (IFRS, 2015i). Finally, since the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) of Australia appoints the Australian Accounting Standards Board’s (AASB) 
members and only oversights the accounting standard-setting process, the AASB was 
chosen to be examined (AASB, 2015a). In brief, the EC, FASF and FRC do not 
INSTITUTION TYPE Coercive Reward Expert
1 EFRAG* Regulator   
2 IOSCO Regulator  
3 US SEC Regulator  
4 Deloitte Accounting Firm  
5 EY Accounting Firm  
6 KPMG Accounting Firm  
7 PwC Accounting Firm  
8 UK FRC* Standard-setter  
9 French ANC Standard-setter  
10 Italian OIC Standard-setter  
11 German DRSC Standard-setter 
12 Japanese ASBJ* Standard-setter 
13 Australia AASB* Standard-setter 
14 CPA of Canada Profession 
15 CFA Institute Profession 
16 AngloGold Ashanti Preparer 
17 Franch AMF Regulator 
18 Basel Committee Regulator 
19 FEI Profession 
20 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm 
21 Japanese FSA Regulator 
22 Korean KASB Standard-setter 
23 Nippon Keidanren Industry Organization 
24 US FAF Standard-setter 
25 Russian MinFin Standard-setter 
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participate directly in the standard-setting process, therefore their core bodies were 
selected for our further research.  
In addition, the standard-setter in the UK is currently FRC, however, previously 
standards were set by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) of the UK which was 
accountable to FRC and therefore, comment letters from both ASB and FRC are seen 
to represent the UK standard-setter’s interests.  
4.2.1. The European Commission (EC) 
The European Commission is one of the main decision-making institutions in the 
European Union (EU) which represents and upholds the interests of its stakeholders. It 
is politically independent driving force within many areas in the EU’s institutional 
system: the EC proposes legislation, policies and action programmes, as well as it is 
responsible for the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council 
implementation. The EC acts on behalf of the whole Union to the outside world with the 
exception of the general foreign and security policy (EU, 2013). 
In 2001, the EC encouraged to establish the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG) which provides the EC not only with input into the development of IFRS 
issued by the IASB but also technical expertise and advice on accounting matters. 
EFRAG is a private sector body which is known as EFRAG Member Organizations and 
includes European stakeholders and national organizations which have knowledge and 
interest in the improvement of IFRS and their impact on the effectiveness of capital 
markets. It participates in the IASB consultation process, as well as performs proactive 
activities in order to ensure that European opinion on the development of international 
financial reporting standards is properly and clearly articulated. Moreover, upon the EC 
request, EFRAG provides the judgment whether newly published IFRS are in conformity 
with the 1606-2002 IAS Regulation and meet the EU criteria for endorsement (EFRAG, 
2015). 
The international financial accounting standards or their interpretations are developed 
and approved by the IASB, however they do not automatically become mandatory in the 
EU as the endorsement process is long and complex (Perry & Nöelke, 2005). The 
standards in Europe can only be adopted by the EC, if they are drawn up in accordance 
with the European public good and fulfil other important criteria, such as 
understandability, relevance, etc. (Flores, 2007). In order to advise the EC, the private 
and public bodies of representatives from the governments of the EU countries were 
established (Perry & Nöelke, 2005). One private sector body is EFRAG which was 
discussed above. The other important body which represents member states’ 
governments and is formed by the civil servants from national ministries is called the 
Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC). Taking into account EFRAG’s advice, the 
regulation draft to adopt a new standard or interpretation is prepared by the EC and is 
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sent to the ARC which can recommend approving it or rejecting i t. If the ARC proposes 
rejection, the EC might either return the standard for further assessment to EFRAG or 
send it to the Council of Ministers for an eventual judgement. In addition, if the 
European Parliament and the Council decide that the EC has exceeded its  
implementing power during the standard-setting process or that the draft is not 
compatible with the aim or the content of the basic IAS regulation or other instruments, 
they can return the standard for revision to the EC within three months’ time 
(Konigsgruber, 2009). In fact, after the standard is endorsed by the EC, it becomes a 
directive applicable to all EU member states (Armstrong et al. 2010).  
However, despite the fact that EFRAG and ARC participate in the IASB standard-setting 
process and provide all information and support regarding IFRS, the EC has the final 
verdict on whether a standard becomes a mandatory regulation or not (Armstrong et al. 
2010). Moreover, the EC also plays an important role to the IASB as the member of 
Monitoring Board where it is responsible for Trustees’ appointment or reappointment 
and also that they execute their duties as stated in the IFRS Foundation Constitution 
(IFRS, 2015j). Furthermore, in order to ensure that the IASB continues developing 
transparent and comparable accounting standards for well functioning capital markets, 
as well as that the EU’s interests are properly taken into account during the process, the 
EC plans to contribute annually approximately 4.3 million euros to the IFRS Foundation 
for the period of 2014-2020 and in 2014 EC’s contributions represented 17% of the 
Foundation’s total budget (EC, 2014). This implies that the EC’s potential influence on 
the IASB and standard-setting process is evident. 
4.2.2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)  
The SEC is a national government agency which regulates the public capital markets in 
the United States (Deloitte, 2015g). It oversees the main participants in securities’ 
markets, such as securities exchanges, securities agents and dealers, investment 
consultants and mutual funds (SEC, 2013). The SEC aims to promote a securities 
market that is worthy of confidence of the public. In order to reach this goal, it focuses 
on market structure and systems strengthening, transparent disclosure to investors, as 
well as it promotes the disclosure of market-related information and protection against 
fraud and abuse (SEC, 2014). Its accounting regulatory authority is delegated to the 
FASB which is overseen by the FAF. The SEC can veto the FASB’s proposals; however 
this veto power is the link between the FASB and politics (Luca & Kinsey, 2013).  
The SEC is one of the key players in shaping the world’s converging accounting 
standards. This has been demonstrated in different contexts. Specifically, in the 1990s, 
the SEC worked indirectly through IOSCO and directly with the IASC in order to develop 
and improve the Committee’s papers. The SEC also worked indirectly to influence the 
IASC’s strategic thinking (Walton, 2009). Moreover, the SEC and IOSCO were 
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important contributors to raising a discussion regarding IASC Board’s reorganization. 
The Chief Accountant of SEC wrote a letter to the IASC’s Strategy Working Party where 
it was stated that IASC’s potential standards would not be considered as possessing 
legitimacy in the world’s capital markets unless IASC were to become a full-time, 
independent body. In addition, its members had to be chosen only on the basis of their 
technical expertise, with the essential research staff and an obligation to follow an open 
and deliberative process, as well as they had to be overseen by a board of Trustees 
formed of individuals who represented the public’s interest and concerns. Despite the 
fact, that it was not stated in the letter, the SEC argue for establishment of a body 
similar to the FASB (Zeff, 2003). 
In the 21st century, the SEC has strongly supported the convergence of IASB and 
FASB’s standards which was officially welcomed by the Norwalk Agreement in 2002. 
Then, in 2007, the SEC finally issued a concept release to permit foreign companies to 
submit financial statements to the Commission according to IFRSs as adopted by the 
IASB (Deloitte, 2015g). However, it is not clear whether the SEC might decide to 
incorporate IFRS into the US domestic financial reporting system and it is not expected 
to do so for the foreseeable future (PwC, 2014). On the other hand, the SEC gets more 
and more experience by working with the companies’ financial statements which are 
reported under IFRS. It continues to work on formal and informal level with the IASB. 
Moreover, the SEC is a direct observer on the IFRS Advisory Council and indirect, 
through the IOSCO on the IFRS Interpretations Committee. It also has a deputy chief 
accountant who comments on IASB discussion papers and exposure drafts regarding 
the international standards. Since 2009, it oversees the general governance of the 
international standards’ structure as a member of the Monitoring Board. Finally, 
indirectly through IOSCO, the SEC participates in a device to ensure that regulators are 
informed of each other’s decisions in respect of IFRS (Walton, 2009). 
4.2.3. International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)  
IOSCO is recognised as the leading multinational organization composed of national 
securities regulators and representatives from national securities exchanges. It 
develops and promotes standards of securities regulation to create efficient and growing 
markets. Moreover, in order to encourage the integrity of markets where standards are 
applied rigorously and enforcement against offences is effective, it provides mutual 
assistance to its international members (FSB, 2015). This association regulates more 
than 95% of the securities markets around the world and continues to expand (IFRS, 
2013). 
IOSCO has played an important role in the legitimating process of standard-setting 
since its collaboration with IASC, the predecessor to IASB. In 1989, both organizations 
reached a consensus that if IASC improved its standards to satisfy global security 
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regulators, IOSCO would consider recommending them for all its members (Nobes & 
Parker, 2012). Finally, in 2000, the international accounting standards for cross-border 
use were endorsed and since then IOSCO closely monitors the standards development 
process, expresses opinion on proposed changes and regularly discusses standard-
setting work with the IASB representatives (IOSCO, 2007). Moreover, in 2013, IOSCO 
and IFRS Foundation announced a new agreement on set of joint protocols in order to 
enhance the quality and consistency in the implementation of financial reporting 
standards globally. This agreement has strengthened both organizations’ cooperation in 
support to their shared commitments to develop high standards (IFRS, 2013). Apart 
from this, IOSCO has an opportunity to exercise its influence on IASB as a member of 
Monitoring Board. It also has one permanent and two rotating seats in IFRS Advisory 
Council, as well as two former employees in each body as members of IASB and 
Trustees of the IFRS Foundation. 
4.2.4. Multinational Audit Firms 
The leading firms in the accounting and consulting industry consist of the Big 4 global 
network firms which include PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Ernst & Young (EY), 
Deloitte and KPMG. These companies dominate the industry in terms of their size, 
ability to provide their services in different parts of the world, and reputation. The Big 4 
accounting firms are at the forefront of any accounting related dilemmas throughout all 
sectors of business and therefore, they have the greatest understanding of modern 
accounting issues and the most diversified experience (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009).That 
has determined that their importance in the regulatory process in recent years has 
increased significantly (Cooper & Robson, 2006). 
However, the global accounting firms have always been involved in the standard setting 
process and have strongly supported the work of the IASC, and later the IASB (Albu et 
al. 2011; Larson & Kenny, 2011). In respect of the IASB, the majority of its members are 
former or recent employees in one of the largest accounting firms (Chiapello & Medjad, 
2009). Moreover, at least two of the IFRS Foundation Trustees must be partners from 
the Big 4 audit companies (Chiapello & Medjad, 2009; Zeff, 2012). There is no doubt 
that they are actively involved in the development of IFRS and also express their 
opinion in comment letters (Larson & Kenny, 2011). Besides, Table 3 shows that the 
global accounting firms together provide 30% of the total amount of IASB contributions. 
That implies that the Big 4 accounting firms can have substantial influence on the IASB 
and it also raises the question regarding its independence (Albu et al. 2011; Larson & 
Kenny, 2011). 
In addition, the Big 4 audit firms play an important role in the whole accounting 
standard-setting process. They have representatives at the EFRAG Supervisory Board 
(SB) and are always willing to provide volunteers on demand (Chiapello & Medjad, 
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2009). Moreover, in order to minimize diversity of IFRS interpretations and applications 
from different Big 4 companies around the world, and to achieve consistency in practice, 
each of them set up international coordination mechanisms which mean “one brand-
name, one interpretation” (Hoogendoorn, 2006, p.24). Specifically, these companies 
established global IFRS desks where they raise questions and answers on all kinds of 
interpretational issues which are not clear in IFRS itself (Hoogendoorn, 2006). In short, 
Chiappelo and Medjad (2009) argue that the four global accounting firms are not only 
the necessary funding donors to standard-setting and main contributors in terms of 
expertise, but they are also the most important actors when it comes to deciding those 
standards will be applied in practice. 
4.2.5. Group of European national standard-setters 
The Autorité des Normes Comptables (ANC) is the national French accounting standard 
setter which is responsible for three main tasks: (1) setting the accounting standards for 
companies in the territory of France; (2) participating in process of the international 
accounting standard-setting and the adoption in Europe; (3) promoting research in 
accounting (EFRAG, 2013). 
The Organismo Italiano di Contabilità (OIC) is Italian accounting standard setter that 
represents and voices national opinions on accounting matters (OIC, 2015). It is in 
charge of three core tasks: (1) issuing accounting standards for companies which align 
with the Civil code in Italy; (2) participating in the international accounting standard-
setting process, as well as providing support to the IFRS implementation group in Italy; 
(3) collaborating with the Legislator in accounting matters (EFRAG, 2013).  
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is an independent regulatory authority in the UK 
which promotes high quality corporate governance and reporting to encourage 
investment. It is accountable for setting corporate reporting, auditing and actuarial 
practice standards and monitoring, as well as enforcing accounting and auditing 
standards. Moreover, the regulatory activities of the actuarial profession and the 
professional accountancy bodies are also overseen by the FRC (FRC, 2015). 
The Accounting Standards Committee of Germany (ASCG or DRSC) is the accounting 
standard setter which acts in accordance to the Commercial Code’s section 342 (1). Its 
responsibilities include the development of recommendations for the future standards 
and applications of accounting principles for consolidated financial statements, as well 
as the interpretation of IFRS development. The ASCG also advises the Federal Ministry 
of Justice regarding the planned legislation on accounting regulations. Moreover, the 
Federal Republic of Germany on international standard-setting authorities are also 
represented by the ASCG (EFRAG, 2013). 
 
Jamburia & Lankevičiūtė (2015). Political Influences on the IASB Accounting Standard-Setting: The Case of the Leases Standard 
42 
 
4.3. Organizational relationships among key actors 
The discussion above on a few key actors suggests that international organizations, 
regulators and various standard setters may as well be involved in a network of 
companies with interlocking relationships. In order to examine whether they have 
access to any networks, Table 6 presents members’ and observers’ interaction between 
the IASB Monitoring Group and IFRS Advisory Council. These two particular bodies 
were chosen, since both of them consist of representatives from organizations that are 
interested in the IASB's work but they are not IASB’s personnel. 
       Table 6. Organizational relationships3  
Monitoring board IFRS Advisory Council US SEC IOSCO BCBS 
Members Members Members Members Members 
EC EC* 
  
EC 
FSA Japan FSA Japan* FSA Japan FSA Japan FSA Japan 
US SEC SEC* 
 
SEC 
 
IOSCO IOSCO 
   
CVM Brazilian* 
 
CVM 
Brazilian 
CVM Brazilian 
 
FSC Korea* 
 
FSC Korea FSC Korea FSC Korea 
BCBS* BCBS 
   
     
*Observers 
    
4.4. Employment relationships among key actors 
The relationships might be identified not only among organizations, but also between 
their employees. Employment relationship in the literature is identified as ‘interlocking 
director’ and is applied when the board of two organizations share the same member 
(Shropshire, 2010). However, due to the lack of available information, our research 
shows only single direction relationships where one company’s board member also sits 
in other companies board and represent its first company. In order to investigate the 
employment interactions between selected key actors, we first searched for the board 
members, as well as the committee board members in each organization’s web page 
and later verified which stakeholders they represent. Overall, the employment 
relationship is identified between 12 out of 25 key actors, due to the fact that not all 
companies disclose full information about their board members or information is not 
provided in English language. Moreover, we relied on the information which was 
presented in the companies’ websites, although it might be not updated. Therefore, 
                                                 
3
 Relationships among IASB Monitoring Group’s and IFRS Advisory Council ’s members and observers  
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Table 7 might not present full picture of employment interactions between key actors, 
but it still helps us to have a better understanding of possible relationships.  
Table 7 shows that the organizations that are deployed in the horizontal line have in 
their boards the representatives or members from the companies which are identified in 
the vertical column. For example, the Financial Accounting Standards Foundation 
(FASF) of Japan has on its board the representative from Deloitte. In comparison, one 
of EY global executive’s is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the US Financial 
Accounting Foundation. In brief, our exploratory research reveals that the most 
relationships are seen among the Big Four actors, and especially between KPMG, as 
their total score are the highest. However, since it was mentioned before, this research 
does not provide conclusive evidence about all key actors’ employment relationships  
Table 7. Employment relationships among key actors  
 
4.5. Chapter summary  
This chapter has revealed that the IASB has been subject to negative political 
influences from different actors across and within its organizational structure and due 
process. It also identified 25 key actors which have coercive, reward or expert power on 
the IASB decision-making process that will be further analysed in the next chapters. 
Specifically, a few main players, such as the EC, SEC, IOSCO and multinational 
accounting firms were presented thoroughly, in order to show their authority and 
influences on the IASB and its standard-setting process. Moreover, the organizational 
relationships among the IASB Monitoring Group and IFRS Advisory Council’s members 
and observers, as well as the employment interactions between the key actors were 
ORGANISATION EFRAG IOSCO EY FRC UK KASB ASCG FASF
 FRC 
Australia
US FAF Total  Score
1 EC X 1
2 SEC (US) X 1
3 Deloitte X X X X 4
4 EY X X X X 4
5 KPMG X X X X X 5
6 PwC X X X X 4
7 UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) X 1
8 French Ministry of Finance (ANC) X 1
9 Organismo Italiano di Contabilità (OIC) X 1
10 Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) X 1
11 Japan Financial Services Agency X 1
12 US Financial Accounting Foundation X 1
    Board Members
    Committees' Board Members
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defined. It revealed that organizations are involved in a network of companies with 
interlocking relationships and the most employment relationships are noticed among the 
Big Four actors.  
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5. Leases Project  
This chapter closely examines the case of the leases project First, it discusses the 
background to the leasing standard. The chapter then explains the proposed lessee 
accounting model called ‘Right-of-use (ROU) model’ as well as other selected focus 
areas and examines the changes in the subsequent drafts of the IASB.   
5.1. Background 
To analyse constituents’ influence on the leasing project, it is crucial to have an 
understanding of the accounting standard. This will set a background to our discussion 
throughout the thesis. The aim of this chapter is to provide a clear picture of our case 
study of the lease accounting standard. Understanding the initially proposed accounting 
model and subsequent changes in the lease standard will set a foundation for Chapter 
6, where we discuss the constituents’ comment letters and analyze the proposed 
changes by the IASB in the light of key actors’ responses. 
5.2. Historical context 
The leases accounting project officially appeared on the technical agenda of the IASB in 
2006, when the board along with the FASB determined to issue a new standard on the 
leases. However, it was not the first time that the international accounting standard-
setter had decided to introduce a new lease standard. It had already been proposed 
previously in the 1990s by the IASB’s predecessor body International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) (Boyle, Carpenter & Mahoney, 2014). However, though 
major work had been done for drawing up a new standard proposal by the G4+1 
committee in 1998, the issue did not advance further and the topic thus disappeared 
from the standard-setting agenda (Beattie, Goodacre & Thomson, 2006). 
The revived interest in the project might have stemmed from various places. However, 
as Boyle, Carpenter and Mahoney (2014) claim, adding the topic to the agendas by the 
IASB and the FASB in 2006 was a response to the report of 2005 by the US SEC which 
called for changes in lease standards in order to reduce off-balance sheet financing. 
The reasoning of the SEC was that as off-balance sheet financing had led to major 
high-profile financial scandals at different times, such as that of Enron, WorldCom and 
Adelphia and had thus raised many questions regarding the practices of financial 
reporting, serious changes had to be introduced (US SEC, 2005).   
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5.3. Lease Accounting 
5.3.1. Current Model  
Two parties involved in the lease transaction are the lessor and the lessee. The lessor 
owns the asset and conveys the right to use this asset to the lessee for an agreed 
period. Based on IAS 17 lessees are required to classify leases into two categories: 
finance and operating leases. Finance leases transfer to the lessee substantially the 
risks and rewards of ownership of the leased asset. All remaining leases are qualified 
as operating leases. Leases classified under finance leases are treated similar to the 
purchase of an asset, based on the accounting concept of ‘substance over form’ since 
substantial risks and rewards of ownership of the asset now rest with the lessee. 
Accordingly, the lessee recognises an asset a liability arising from the lease and 
subsequently accounts for depreciation and interest charges. In contrast, under 
operating leases no asset or liability is recognised by the lessee, therefore, only rentals 
are charged to the income statement (IAS 17).  
There has been a lot of criticism over the current accounting standard on leases. Firstly, 
it is important to consider the off-balance sheet financing related to operating leases. 
The assets or liabilities are not recognised on the balance sheet of the lessee, which 
gives rise to unrecognized finance. Off-balance sheet financing comes into conflict with 
the Conceptual Framework, which states that the financial statement must faithfully and 
completely represent all an individual’s liabilities (Clendon, 2015).  
By off-balance sheet method, preparers can influence two important financial ratios, 
such as return on capital employed (ROCE) and gearing. In businesses having 
operating leases, ROCE is shown to be higher, and gearing, a financial risk indicator, is 
shown to be lower. As a result, financial performance based on ROCE is seen as 
efficient, while the risks are deliberately hidden from users. Businesses have also 
practised selling their buildings and leasing them back to influence these indicators 
(Scott, 2006). Off-balance sheet financing can impact the decision-making process of 
users of financial statements, such as lenders (Hartman and Sami, 1989). The study of 
Hartman and Sami (1989) shows that the lenders would charge a lower interest rate to 
businesses that had operating leases rather than businesses having finance leases.  
Lately, the criticism has been regarded that the nature of transactions in both leases is 
similar, and that they should not be accounted for differently. The existing accounting 
model for lessees fails to meet the needs of users, due to the fact that it fails to 
represent faithfully leasing transactions (FASB; 2015). 
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5.3.2. Proposed ROU model  
Discussion Paper about a new approach to lease accounting was issued by IASB and 
FASB in March 2009, which introduces radically different views on lease accounting.  
According to the mutual definitions of IASB and FASB based on the Conceptual 
Framework, assets are created from past events, can be controlled by the entity and are 
expected to bring future economic benefits. According to the DP the leased item 
represents an economic resource of the lessee as it can be used to generate cash 
inflows. Moreover, the Boards concluded that the lessees obtain the right to use 
particular assets from lease agreements (past events), can control these assets during 
the contract period (control) and leased assets will potentially give rise to future 
economic benefits for the entities (future economic benefits). Therefore, the right to use 
a leased item for the lease term has been concluded to meet the definition of an asset 
in the CF and the Boards decided to introduce a category of right-of-use assets (IASB & 
FASB; 2009). 
On the other hand, the lease agreements also create obligation to pay rentals. 
According to the DP, a liability is a present obligation that arises from past events, 
related to expected outflows of economic benefits from the business. The Boards 
decided that the lease obligation to pay rentals meets the definition of a liability. 
Therefore, for all leases, the lessee will have to recognise an asset that represents the 
right to use the leased item for the lease term (the ‘right-of-use’ asset) and a liability for 
its obligation to pay rentals upon inception of the lease (IASB & FASB; 2009). To reach 
the conclusion the Boards also discussed other approaches to lease accounting such 
as ‘the whole asset approach’ and ‘the executory contract approach’, however, 
dismissed them as not able to solve the problems associated with the existing standard.  
It is important to point out, that the new approach abolishes differentiation for leases. All 
the leases will be accounted for similarly. According to the DP, the new lease 
accounting will eliminate off-balance sheet presentation and reduce structuring 
opportunities of leases by preparers. Comparability of financial statements is argued to 
be increased as a result of these steps (IASB & FASB, 2009). The ED maintained the 
ROU model that all leases should be treated similarly (IASB & FASB, 2010). The Re-ED 
did not introduce any changes to the model itself and no tentative decisions indicating 
such a shift has been identified in the post-Re-ED stage (IASB & FASB, 2013; IASB & 
FASB, 2015).  
5.3.3. Key Issues  
Based on the inductive approach explained in Chapter 3, we distinguished four focus 
areas out of all key issues that could be identified in the standard: ROU model; Lease 
term, Short-term leases and Dual Accounting, the remaining three of which will be 
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discussed next. The information regarding changes in all identified key issues in the 
standard is summarized in Appendix C. 
 Lease Term 
“The lease term is the non-cancellable period for which the lessee has contracted to 
lease the asset together with any further terms for which the lessee has the option to 
continue to lease the asset, with or without further payment, when at the inception of the 
lease it is reasonably certain that the lessee will exercise the option” (IAS 17, p.7).  
Hence, IAS 17 defines the lease term as the non-cancellable contract period 
considering any further renewal terms when they are reasonably certain to be 
exercised. The DP instead proposes a different approach to recognize assets and 
liabilities over the most likely lease term, including all renewal options.  
Example: The Boards give an example that for instance in a 10-year lease including a 
renewal option of additional five years; the lessee must decide whether the most likely 
lease term is 10 or 15 years (IASB & FASB, 2009).  
Under the new model, the lessees should recognize the right-of-use asset for the lease 
term. Therefore, the longer the lease term is, more amount is recognized on the balance 
sheet of the lessee under assets and liabilities. Therefore, this increases preparers’ 
leverage ratios, decreasing their appeal to potential investors. Thus, it is natural that 
preparers would be dissatisfied with any suggested model that would make their 
liabilities seem larger. 
In the ED, the Boards proposed the lease term to be the longest possible term that is 
more likely than not to occur taking into account effects of renewal options.  
Example: The entity may have a lease that has a non-cancellable 10-year term, an 
option to renew for five years at the end of 10 years and another option to renew for five 
years at the end of 15 years. The probability of each term is the following: (a) 40% 
probability of 10-year term; (b) 30% probability of 15-year term; (c) 30% probability of 
15-year term. There is a 60% chance that the term will be 15 years or longer, where 
there is only 30% chance that the term will be 20 years or longer, therefore, according 
to the new proposal the term of at least 15 years is the longest term more likely than not 
to occur. The lease term is hence determined to be 15 years (IASB & FASB, 2010). 
According to the Re-ED, the lease term is given a new definition. The lease term is a 
non-cancellable period of the lease together with periods covering any options to extend 
or terminate the lease, provided that the lessee has a significant economic incentive  
to exercise such options. For instance, if the lessee pays for leasehold improvements 
that are expected to have the significant value even after the contractual period, then it 
can be concluded that the lessee would have a significant economic incentive to 
exercise an option (IASB & FASB, 2013).  
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Based on the redeliberations by the Boards post-Re-ED stage, when determining the 
lease term the lessees should consider all relevant factors that create economic 
incentives to exercise renewal options, and should include such options in the lease 
term only if it is reasonably certain  that the lessee will exercise the option. The words 
‘reasonably certain’ emphasize that a high threshold will establish the lease term (IASB 
& FASB, 2015). Therefore, the Re-ED proposal is further detailed here, emphasizing the 
addition of the phrase ‘reasonably certain’, maintaining that the options should give rise 
to economic incentives to be considered for inclusion in the lease term, but there is no 
more emphasis on the term significant. Therefore, the suggestions made for the lease 
term is similar to the current definition of the lease term in IAS 17.   
As a result, from the stage of the DP to the expected standard it can be seen that the 
requirements for the lease term relatively softened. For renewal options to be 
considered in the lease term, the lessees now need to examine their economic 
incentives that are reasonably certain to be exercised, which significantly would limit the 
renewal options included in the lease term and would represent a relief for preparers.  
The development of the standard regarding the lease term is demonstrated in Table 8, 
which also shows changes in other focus areas. 
 Short-term Leases 
The definitions of short-term leases did not appear in IAS 17, as there was already a 
distinction between finance and operating leases. Therefore, any short-term lease 
would fall under operating leases.  
In the DP the Boards were undecided whether to allow for any scope exclusions for 
certain short-term assets. They were concerned that such exclusions could introduce 
more complexity to preparers and users, however, noted that short-term leases could 
be immaterial to the lessee. In particular, costs associated with recognition and 
measurement of such leases (short-term leases commonly defined as leases less than 
one year) could outweigh the benefits. However, short-term leases could still give rise to 
material assets and liabilities; also, such scope exclusion could potentially lead to 
structuring possibilities and reduce comparability in turn (IASB & FASB, 2009).  
The ED defines short-term leases as leases for which the maximum possible lease 
term, including options to renew or extend, is twelve months or less. The ED clarifies 
the Boards’ decisions that all short-term leases should be included within the scope, 
although presents the special treatment that can be applied to short-term leases: the 
lessee can recognise undiscounted payments on the balance sheet rather than applying 
the regular ROU model where present values of future lease payments are recognised 
on the balance sheet (IASB & FASB, 2010). The proposal in the ED would affect the 
financial position of lessees since they would have to recognize more assets and 
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liabilities on the balance sheet and therefore, it can be regarded as a significant issue 
for preparers. 
The Re-ED proposes a contrasting approach to the ED, providing a choice for the 
lessees to either recognise short-term leases according to the ROU model or to 
recognise lease payments in profit or loss without recognising assets and liabilities 
(IASB & FASB, 2013). Therefore, in essence lessees can choose to apply the same 
treatment to short-term leases as currently for operating leases. The Expected Standard 
based on the Boards’ redeliberations maintains the exemption for short-term leases, 
however, the Boards state that the definition of short-term leases will be brought in line 
with the definition of the lease term (IASB & FASB, 2015).  
Overall, the Boards have changed their decision from inclusion of the short-term leases 
within the scope towards the exemption, which represents a move in favour of 
preparers, as they will have to recognize less assets and liabilities on their balance 
(Table 8).  
 Dual Accounting Model 
The dual accounting approach only appeared on the Boards’ agenda during the Re-ED 
stage, which sets the criteria for classifying leases into two types: Type A and Type B 
leases. According to the Re-ED, the classification is based on the nature of the assets. 
In particular, property would fall under Type B leases and any assets other than 
property would represent Type A leases. Property would be defined as land or a 
building, or part of a building or both, however, there were two  additional criteria where 
a ROU asset could be classified as Type A lease even if it was property: (1) when the 
lease term represented the major part of the asset’s remaining economic life, or (2) 
when the present value of the lease payments accounted for substantially all of the fair 
value of the leased asset at the lease inception. The treatment of both Type A and B 
leases would be similar on the balance sheet, and only the income statement would be 
affected as a result of this classification. For all leases ROU assets and corresponding 
liabilities would be recognized and initially measured at the present value of lease 
payments. As for subsequent measurement, for Type A leases it was proposed to 
recognize interest on the lease liability separately from the amortization of the ROU 
asset reflecting the pattern in which the lessee would expect to consume the ROU 
asset’s future economic benefits, whereas for Type B leases it was proposed to 
recognize the total lease cost on a straight-line basis over the lease term as a single 
item including both the unwinding of the discount on the liability (i.e. interest) and the 
amortisation of the right-of-use asset (IASB & FASB, 2013). As the Type B leases were 
proposed to account for on a straight-line basis, for Type A leases costs would be 
recognized in a different manner, the unwinding of the discount in the beginning of the 
lease could result in higher costs than in later periods of the lease. Therefore, this 
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approach could created differences in the financial performance of entities having Type 
A and Type B leases. 
Based on the redeliberations in 2014, the IASB decided on a single approach for lessee 
accounting, under which a lessee would account for all leases as Type A leases, hence, 
would recognize interest on the lease liability separately from the amortization of the 
ROU asset. In contrast, FASB maintained the dual approach classifying most current 
finance/capital leases as Type A leases and remaining operating leases as Type B 
leases (IASB & FASB, 2015).  
5.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the leasing project, particularly focusing on the key issues in the 
proposed standard. It showed how the SEC could have contributed to the revival of 
interest in the leasing standard. This was followed by the discussion on the existing 
leasing standard, where the major criticisms were distinguished to be off-balance sheet 
financing and deliberate structuring of leases as operating leases to impact key ratios 
such as ROCE and gearing and affect the views of financial statement users. The 
chapter also outlined that the major change proposed by the IASB is the ROU model 
which requires all leases to be capitalised on the balance sheet. Other key issues in the 
standard on the lease term, short-term leases and dual accounting model were also 
examined, following the changes in the IASB’s decisions on them along the standard-
setting process. It was also emphasized that these proposals can determine the size of 
liabilities as well as the magnitude of costs recognized by the lessees and can therefore 
substantially affect preparers’ financial position and performance. Key actors’ positions 
regarding these issues will be explored in Chapter 6.   
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Table 8. Changes in Focus Areas – from DP to Expected Standard 
 
No. FOCUS AREAS IAS 17 DP ED Re-ED Exp. Standard CONSEQUENCES
ROU
Lessee Accounting Model: 
Right-of-Use Model
Finance and operating 
leases
all capitalised all capitalised all capitalised all capitalised No change
1
Standard Scope: Short-
term Leases (leases with a 
maximum possible 
contractual lease term, 
including any options to 
extend, of 
12 months or less)
not specified undecided
inclusion (simplified: 
not discounting)
voluntary capitalization 
(e.g. choice between 
capitalization and 
recording as expenditure 
is possible)
voluntary capitalization (e.g. 
choice between capitalization 
and recording as expenditure 
is possible)
Proposed capitalization for short-
term leases first but later allowed 
voluntary capitalization
2 Lease Term
Recognition over non-
cancellable term; 
examining bargain 
purchases
Recognition over 
most likely term: 
Inclusion of renewal 
options
Recognition over 
most likely term: 
Inclusion of renewal 
options
Recognition over non-
cancellable period of the 
lease; Inclusion of 
renewal options (if 
significant econ. 
incentive) 
Recognition over a high 
threshold if significant econ. 
Incentive is expected to be 
realized,  (if reasonably 
certain that it will exercise 
option)
Started from inclusion of all 
renewal options of the most likely 
term but later added the words 
'significant economic incentives' 
further amending it to the phrase 
'reasonably certain to exercise'
3
Dual Accounting Model
(treatment of leases in 
income statement)
N/A none none
Type A leases: interest 
and amortisation 
separately (e.g. finance)
Type B: single lease cost 
incl. both interest cost 
and amortisation (e.g. 
operating)
All Type A: recognize 
amortisation of the ROU 
asset separately from interest 
on the lease liability
Introduced dual model on Re-ED 
level but then switched to single 
model while FASB maintained dual 
accounting model
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6. Comment Letters  
Chapter 5 has reviewed the major changes in focus areas of the leasing standard from 
the stage of the DP up till the Expected Standard. Chapter 4 has introduced the key 
actors in the IASB standard-setting process. This chapter examines the comment letters 
from the key actors on the focus areas to identify whether they have influenced the 
changes in the standard.   
6.1. Background 
The identified actors include 18 out of 25 key actors, due to the fact that only they 
submitted comment letter to the Boards. 
Table 9. Key actors 
  INSTITUTION TYPE CLs No. DP ED Re-ED 
1 EFRAG Regulator Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
2 IOSCO Regulator Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
3 US SEC  Regulator No 0 No No No 
4 Deloitte Accounting Firm Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
5 EY Accounting Firm Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
6 KPMG Accounting Firm Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
7 PwC Accounting Firm Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
8 UK FRC Standard-setter Yes 5 Yes Yes Yes 
9 French ANC Standard-setter Yes 3 No Yes Yes 
10 Italian OIC Standard-setter Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
11 German DRSC Standard-setter Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
12 Japanese ASBJ Standard-setter Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
13 Australia AASB Standard-setter Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
14 CPA of Canada Profession No 0 No No No 
15 CFA Institute Profession Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
16 AngloGold Ashanti  Preparer No 0 No No No 
17 French AMF Regulator No 0 No No No 
18 Basel Committee Regulator Yes 1 No Yes No 
19 FEI Profession Yes 8 Yes Yes Yes 
20 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
21 Japanese FSA Regulator No 0 No No No 
22 Korean KASB Standard-setter Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes 
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23 Nippon Keidanren 
Industry 
Organization 
Yes 1 No Yes No 
24 US FAF Standard-setter No 0 No No No 
25 Russian MinFin Standard-setter No 0 No No No 
    
Total number of comment 
letters: 57       
 
Source: The comment letters have been retrieved for the DP, ED, Re-ED stages from the 
corresponding websites of IASB & FASB (2009a), IASB & FASB (2010a) and IASB & FASB 
(2013a). 
6.2. Focus Areas 
6.2.1. ROU Model 
Upon the issuance of the DP, the Boards invited comments on the specific topic of ROU 
to hear respondents’ views regarding the recognition of a right-of-use asset and a 
corresponding liability. Table 10 shows the answers from key actors: most respondents 
support the suggested approach, though some of them have reservations and therefore 
only partly support the ROU model. For instance, EFRAG suggested that considering 
lessor accounting could have affected the Boards’ views on the lessee accounting, 
therefore, they preferred to be aware of full implications of the new accounting model. 
ASBJ had reservations whether the approach was in line with the revenue recognition 
standard and AASB was concerned that the impact on income statement had not been 
fully discussed by the Boards. Apart from these concerns, many respondents 
emphasized the need to include lessor accounting in the standard as well as consider 
lease/service differentiation in a more detailed way. However, these views only affected 
the participants’ overall stance towards the whole standard and not the ROU model 
specifically. ANC was strongly opposed the concept, since they expected the standard 
to make a distinction between leases that correspond to in-substance purchases of 
assets and leases that correspond to the acquisition of a right of use. KPMG was 
undecided, as they did not believe the DP had articulated it clearly how the ROU model 
was superior to other models and how it would be applicable to more complex leases.  
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Table 10. ROU Model – DP 
Do you agree that a lessee should recognise a right-of-use asset and a liability to make 
lease payments? 
 
Yes No Undecided 
Regulator EFRAG (partly), IOSCO 
  
Accounting Firm Deloitte, EY, PwC, Grant Thornton 
 
KPMG 
Standard-setter 
FRC, OIC, DRSC, KASB, ASBJ 
(partly), AASB (partly)  
ANC 
 
Profession CFA Institute, FEI   
 
The ED repeated the question regarding the ROU model to which the answers 
remained broadly similar to those during the DP stage. EFRAG now decided to fully 
support the proposal, while IOSCO had no concerns even after the DP. Deloitte and 
PwC remained supportive of the ROU model, to which KPMG joined while EY 
reconsidered its position and demonstrated only partial agreement with the ROU model. 
FRC remained fully supportive of the concept further justifying its position with 
arguments for the ROU model. Other European standard-setters demonstrated partial 
approval of the new approach, while ANC remained radically opposing to it, claiming 
that it lacks the robust conceptual basis. Out of all respondents only KASB and Nippon 
Keidanren showed concern that the Draft Standard was highly focused on financial 
statement users and did little to incorporate the interests of other parties such as 
preparers whether lessees or lessors. Those actors that partially supported the model 
maintained that significant improvements had to be made to the standard, such as 
clarifying distinction between service and lease so that the approach could appropriately 
reflect the economics of transactions and assessing whether benefits from change 
would outweigh the costs of implementing the standard. Overall, the actors supported 
the ROU model and their major concerns regarded other specific standard issues and 
not the model itself. 
The Re-ED did not pose a similar question regarding the ROU model anymore; 
therefore, only two stages are considered here for exploring the respondents’ attitudes.  
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Table 11. ROU Model – ED 
Do you agree that a lessee should recognise a right-of-use asset and a liability to make 
lease payments? 
 
Fully supports Partly supports Does not support 
Regulator EFRAG, IOSCO 
  
Accounting Firm Deloitte, KPMG, PwC EY, Grant Thornton 
 
Standard-setter FRC, ASBJ OIC, DRSC, AASB, KASB ANC 
Profession CFA Institute, FEI 
  
Industry 
Organization   
Nippon Keidanren 
6.2.2. Lease Term 
The DP suggested that the recognition of assets and liabilities should happen over the 
most likely lease term. Following the DP, comment letters were received to the following 
question: “Do you support the proposed approach? If you disagree with the proposed 
approach, please describe what alternative approach you would support and why” 
(IASB & FASB, 2009, p. 69). 
The period following the DP was characterised by diverse and conflicting opinions 
regarding the topic. Many respondents did not agree with the proposed approach and 
instead suggested alternative approaches.  
Table 12. Lease term – DP 
Should the assets and liabilities be recognised over the most likely lease term? 
  
Yes No 
Fully Partly Fully Partly 
Regulator 
 
EFRAG, 
IOSCO  
EFRAG, IOSCO 
Accounting Firm 
 
EY 
Deloitte, KPMG, PwC, 
Grant Thornton 
EY 
Standard-setter AASB KASB 
FRC, ANC, OIC, DRSC, 
ASBJ 
KASB 
Profession 
 
CFA Institute FEI CFA Institute 
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On the other hand, some constituents partly agreed with the DP but still proposed new 
suggestions for the lease term definition. This is illustrated in Table 13: 
 
Table 13. Lease term – DP: Alternatives 
ALTERNATIVES RESPONDENTS 
Supports the DP approach: Over most likely term 
EFRAG (P4); IOSCO (P); EY; AASB; CFA 
Institute (P); KASB (P)  
Disagrees with the DP approach: Over most likely 
term 
KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, FRC, ANC, OIC, 
DRSC, ASBJ, FEI, Grant Thornton 
More Likely than Not (incorporated in the ED) Deloitte, FRC 
Components approach EFRAG (P), DRSC, CFA Institute, ANC 
Probability-weighted approach IOSCO (P), Grant Thornton 
Best-estimate approach IOSCO (P), PwC 
Reasonably Certain EY (P), KPMG, FEI 
Virtually certain ASBJ 
Qualitative assessment KASB (P) 
Options only in disclosures OIC 
EFRAG, DRSC, ANC and CFA Institute proposed components approach which 
considers recognition and measurement of lease options separately from the ROU 
asset. However, this approach has not been considered by the IASB at any stage, since 
its view was to assess optional periods at the recognition stage of the asset. Others 
agreed that options should be recognised together with the ROU asset. Interestingly, 
rather radical view was held by OIC that argued that options should only be included in 
the disclosures as they do not satisfy the definition of the liability based on the 
Conceptual Framework of the IASB, as there is no obligation created at the lease 
inception date. The similar opinion was held by DRSC who also claimed that there is no 
present obligation based on the past event and that it could only be acceptable in rare 
circumstances, such as when lessees have no alternative economically other than 
exercising the option. ANC has a similar view to other European standard-setters – OIC 
and DRSC. However, the IASB never considered in its standard drafts to completely 
exclude lease options from the lease term determination. No view dominated in the 
post-DP stage, however, most users that were against the proposed approach in the 
DP, argued that ‘the most likely’ basis would introduce more volatility in the financial 
statements of companies, therefore, reducing comparability, as well as negatively 
                                                 
4
 P (Partly ) – indicates partial support for the proposal and is essentially used when respondents support 
more than one proposal.  
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affecting decision-usefulness and relevance. Importantly, ‘more likely than not’ definition 
for the lease term was suggested by Deloitte and FRC which subsequently became 
incorporated in the ED. Both Deloitte and FRC present i llustrative examples of two 
different lease term models (‘most likely’ and ‘more likely than not’). Deloitte provides an 
example based on a 10-year lease with 5-year renewal option and demonstrates how 
using the most likely lease term approach the lease could be structured in a way that 
would make the lease term appear less than it actually was and also shows how ‘more 
likely than not’ approach would solve this problem. FRC also illustrates how the ‘most 
likely lease term’ model fails in certain cases and ‘more likely than not’ approach seems 
superior. Apart from Deloitte and FRC, only ASBJ is seen to present an illustrative 
example. 
In the ED, the Boards proposed the ‘more likely than not’ lease term model. As seen 
from Table 14, most respondents were against the proposal of ‘more likely than not’ 
lease term, with IOSCO and FEI only partly supporting the concept.  
Table 14. Lease term – ED 
Should the assets and liabilities be recognised over the 'more likely than not' lease term? 
  Yes No 
Regulator IOSCO (partly) EFRAG 
Accounting Firm 
 
Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC, Grant Thornton 
Standard-setter 
 
FRC, ANC, OIC, ASBJ, KASB 
Profession FEI (partly) CFA Institute, FEI (partly)  
Industry Organization 
 
Nippon Keidanren 
Participants suggested different approaches and in contrast to the DP stage, more 
respondents had similar views regarding the lease term: they perceived that the lease 
term had to be based on the threshold of ‘reasonably certain’, i.e. options should only 
be incorporated in the ROU asset, when their exercise is reasonably certain at the lease 
inception date. Less popular alternatives were components approach, probability-
weighted approach and approaches based on ‘most likely’, highly likely or ‘virtually 
certain’ lease terms. Excluding options from the ROU asset and basing the lease term 
on the contractual term was also suggested by OIC and Nippon Keidanren. The 
arguments against the approach ‘the longest possible term more likely than not’ were 
the following: 
 Under this approach options that do not meet the definition of the liabilities would 
be capitalised; 
 The use of this low threshold could overstate the liabilities; 
 It would not provide relevant information for the users of financial statements.  
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On the other hand, most respondents sti ll supported inclusion of lease options in the 
ROU asset, since it would reduce structuring opportunities; however, they also 
advocated the approach where options are reasonably certain / assured to be 
exercised. Among them EY explained that when lessees have significant economic 
incentives to exercise the option, options can seen as ‘reasonably certain’ to be 
exercised. 
Table 15. Lease term – ED: Alternatives 
ALTERNATIVES RESPONDENTS 
Supports the ED approach: More Likely than Not IOSCO (P), FEI (P) 
Disagrees with ED approach: More Likely than Not 
EFRAG, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC, FRC, 
ANC, OIC, ASBJ, CFA Institute, FEI (P), 
Grant Thornton, KASB, Nippon 
Keidanren 
Significant Economic Incentive (incorporated in the 
Re-ED) 
EY (P) 
Components approach ANC 
Probability-weighted approach CFA Institute 
'Most likely' approach KASB 
Reasonably Certain 
EFRAG, EY, KPMG, FRC, ASBJ, FEI (P), 
Grant Thornton 
Virtually certain Deloitte, PwC 
Highly likely IOSCO (P) 
Contractual lease term only, options not on balance OIC, Nippon Keidanren 
 
After the ED, the IASB abandoned the definition of ‘more likely than not’ and refined the 
standard to determine the lease term based on the significant economic incentive, 
which it claimed to be similar to the concept of ‘reasonably certain’ existing in the 
current IAS 17, which apparently most respondents were suggesting. However, as seen 
from Table 16, most respondents were still against the proposed definition of the lease 
term, claiming that introduction of the new term ‘significant economic incentive’ could 
pose new complexities for preparers, as it was not clear whether this new threshold was 
equal, higher or lower than the existing threshold of ‘reasonably certain’.  
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Table 16. Lease term – Re-ED 
Should the lease term be determined according to the significant economic incentive of 
lessees? 
 
Yes No 
Regulator IOSCO EFRAG 
Accounting Firm EY Deloitte, KPMG, PwC 
Standard-setter 
DRSC, ASBJ (partly), AASB, 
KASB 
FRC, ANC, OIC, ASBJ (partly) 
Profession CFA Institute (partly)  FEI, CFA Institute (partly)  
   
Instead, respondents’ opinions were even more in line with one another compared to 
the ED stage and now there were only two new approaches suggested. While 
components approach was only recommended by one constituent (OIC), the approach 
based on current IAS 17 standard which proposes to determine the lease term based 
on the threshold of ‘reasonably certain’ was largely supported by different types of 
constituents, such as EFRAG (Regulator), three Big 4 firms, two European standard-
setters, etc. 
 
Table 17. Lease term – Re-ED: Alternatives 
ALTERNATIVES RESPONDENTS 
Supports the Re-ED approach based on: Significant 
Economic Incentive 
IOSCO, EY, DRSC, ASBJ (P), AASB, CFA 
Institute (P), KASB 
Disagrees with Re-ED approach based on: 
Significant Economic Incentive 
EFRAG, Deloitte, KPMG, PwC, FRC, 
ANC, OIC, FEI 
Reasonably Certain (expected to be incorporated in 
the Standard) 
EFRAG, Deloitte, KPMG, PwC, FRC, 
ANC, ASBJ, FEI 
Components approach OIC, CFA Institute (P) 
After the Re-ED, the Boards have tentatively decided to base the determination of the 
lease term on the threshold of ‘reasonably certain / assured’, in line with most key 
actors’ views. 
6.2.3. Short-term leases 
As noted in Chapter 5, the Boards were undecided whether to include the short-term 
leases within the scope. Therefore, they invited comments regarding this issue. The 
question was the following: “Should the proposed new standard exclude short-term 
leases? Please explain why?” (IASB & FASB, 2009, p.22). 
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Table 18. Short-term leases – DP 
Should the proposed new standard exclude short-term leases? 
  Yes No 
Regulator EFRAG (partly) EFRAG (partly), IOSCO 
Accounting Firm 
 
Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC, Grant Thornton 
Standard-setter ASBJ, KASB FRC, ANC, OIC, DRSC, AASB 
Profession FEI CFA Institute 
As seen from Table 18, most actors were against excluding short-term leases from the 
scope. Most actors gave the following reasons for not justifying exclusion:  
 Whether short-term or long-term, the right-of-use asset is created, therefore, 
there is no conceptual basis for such a distinction; 
 The distinction would be arbitrary and could provide for structuring possibilities 
and misuse; 
 It would introduce a rules-based guidance; 
Actors suggested that lessees should be able to assess materiality of assets 
themselves and apply general materiality principle as included in the Conceptual 
Framework. Only a few actors thought short-term leases should be excluded, among 
which EFRAG held an undecided position, as it had opinions both for and against the 
proposal. These actors all considered cost/benefit implications, that costs of recognizing 
such short-term leases could outweigh the benefits and therefore, it would be 
favourable to have an exception to lessen the burden on preparers. However, in the 
subsequent ED, the Boards proposed inclusion of short-term leases within the scope. 
They asked constituents whether they agreed with the capitalisation of short-term 
leases.  
Table 19. Short-term leases – ED 
Should the short-term leases be capitalised? 
 
Yes No 
Regulator EFRAG, Basel IOSCO 
Accounting Firm Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC Grant Thornton 
Standard-setter FRC, ANC, OIC, ASBJ, KASB 
 
Profession FEI CFA Institute 
Industry Organization Nippon Keidanren 
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As seen from Table 19, most actors were against capitalisation of short-term leases. 
The actors were concerned that the standard did not provide enough relief for lessees; 
therefore they argued that costs of recognising and measuring short-term leases would 
not exceed benefits. FEI, one of the actors, also added that it would represent a burden 
especially for small companies which rely on short-term leases to a greater degree than 
larger ones. Most actors thought that the treatment currently available for operating 
leases would be relevant for short-term leases. However, there were still actors 
supporting capitalisation of leases. For instance, CFA Institute argued that such a 
treatment would avoid structuring possibilities.  
On the Re-ED stage as seen in Chapter 5 the Boards proposed a relief for short-term 
leases. They did not ask a specific question regarding short-term leases in the draft, 
however, some constituents still identified this as an important issue.           
Table 20. Short-term leases – Re-ED 
Explicit support for the exclusion of short-term leases 
 
Yes No 
Regulator EFRAG 
 
Accounting Firm KPMG 
 
Standard-setter FRC, ANC, DRSC, ASBJ AASB 
While several actors demonstrated support for the proposal on short-term leases, they 
also identified concerns. FRC, ANC, DRSC, ASBJ and EFRAG all commented that the 
short-term lease definition had to become in line with the lease term definition. They 
argued that some non-short-term leases where actors do not have significant economic 
incentives to undertake an option would essentially have a lease term similar to short-
term leases. Therefore, they supported eradication of conceptual differences between 
these two terms.  
6.2.4. Dual Accounting Approach  
Chapter 5 discussed how the Boards introduced a new classification model of leases on 
the Re-ED stage. Comment letters received to Re-ED from key actors all emphasized 
the significance of the topic and urged the Boards to reconsider the decisions, since 
most of the constituents did not support the dual accounting model, while some only 
supported partly (Table 21).  
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Table 21. Dual Accounting Model – Re-ED 
Do you agree that the principle on the lessee’s expected consumption of the economic 
benefits embedded in the underlying asset should be applied which differ depending on 
whether the underlying asset is property? 
 
Fully supports Partly supports Does not support 
Regulator 
 
IOSCO EFRAG 
Accounting Firm 
 
Grant Thornton Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC 
Standard-setter 
 
AASB, KASB FRC, ANC, OIC, DRSC, ASBJ 
Profession 
  
CFA Institute, FEI 
Almost all respondents thought that basing the classification on the nature of the 
underlying asset would result in economically similar transactions treated differently. 
IOSCO, KPMG, OIC and DRSC claimed that such a classification could provide for 
structuring opportunities and the ‘bright line’ criticized in the existing IAS 17 standard 
could appear in the new standard in the new manner, though affecting income 
statement only. EFRAG, KPMG, FRC, OIC and DRSC argued that dual approach could 
increase complexity for preparers, since there was significant judgement involved in 
classifying leases as Type A or B. EFRAG, KPMG and FRC emphasized that it could 
even affect understandability among users. Overall, it can be concluded actors had 
various concerns with the dual accounting model and there were two distinguishable 
positions: some supported the dual approach but with significant modifications while 
others argued that a single accounting model had to be adopted (Table 22). 
Table 22. Dual Accounting Model – Re-ED: Alternatives 
ALTERNATIVES RESPONDENTS 
Supports dual accounting model but only 
conditional upon changes 
IOSCO (P); Deloitte (P); EY (P); PwC; 
ANC; DRSC (P); ASBJ; AASB; FEI; Grant 
Thornton; KASB 
Supports single accounting model (expected to be 
incorporated in the Standard) 
EFRAG, IOSCO (P), Deloitte, KPMG; 
FRC; DRSC; CFA Institute 
Does not have a particular preference OIC 
 
As seen from the redeliberations by the IASB, the single accounting model has been 
preferred to be followed. 
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6.3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrated positions of key actors regarding the major issues in the 
standard on all three stages of the due process of the IASB. It showed that some 
constituents supported whereas others opposed policies regarding the ROU model, 
lease term, short-term leases and dual accounting model. The chapter also 
distinguished proposals suggested by the key actors for the focus areas of the standard 
and wherever applicable, identified major arguments used by respondents to support 
their positions. These findings are analysed subsequently in Chapter 7 using our 
theoretical framework.   
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7. Discussion  
Chapter 4 identified the key actors based on the power sources model which was 
followed by the introduction of key issues in the leasing standard in Chapter 5. Chapter 
6 presented key actors’ opinions regarding the selected sections of the leases project. 
The following chapter analyzes findings in Chapters 5 and 6 using the one-dimensional 
model of power, as a result of which successful and unsuccessful actors are identified 
and afterwards, links are sought to the power sources the actors hold applying the 
regulatory space concept. The results are further analysed with the broad lens of 
regulatory space incorporating the tool of regulatory conversations to discuss the 
regulatory arena of the leasing standard-setting.  
7.1. Influences 
The identified actors include 18 out of 25 key actors, due to the fact that only they 
submitted comment letter to the Boards. Table 9 in Chapter 6 presented all actors that 
participated in the comment letter stages of the IASB. Among those that did not 
participate are SEC, CPA Canada, AMF, Japan Financial Services Agency, Financial 
Accounting Foundation (US), and others. While they do not have an explicit influence 
demonstrated in comment letters, it is hard to say that for instance SEC does not 
influence the standard-setting process of the IASB, since it holds significant coercive 
power over the IASB. Therefore, we will only consider those actors’ influences that did 
participate in the due process of the IASB.  Firstly, the influences will be analysed case 
by case for ROU model, Lease term, Short-term leases and Dual accounting model. 
Later, the influences will be aggregated and an overall picture will be i llustrated.  
7.1.1. ROU Model 
First of all, it is important to identify the actors who have had most influences on the 
overall ROU model. As Table 23 demonstrates the following organizations have shown 
full support to the ROU model, i.e. capitalization of all leases on the balance sheet: 
IOSCO, Deloitte, PwC, FRC, CFA Institute and FEI. Out of them Deloitte, PwC and FRC 
have both reward and expert powers, whereas CFA Institute and FEI hold expert 
powers only. IOSCO holds both coercive and expert powers. Therefore, one 
characteristic among those actors fully supporting the ROU model is the expert power 
held. Having employee ties with IASB or its affiliated committees could be seen as a 
good ground for advocating desired policies without it being visible to the public. 
EFRAG being a representative of EU which along with IOSCO holds coercive power 
can be seen quite influential, as without their support the model may not have 
progressed successfully. It can be seen that most other actors have also supported the 
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model at least during one stage. As a result, it can be claimed that key actors have 
influenced the direction of the ROU model and have given the ‘green light’ for the IASB 
to go forward with the project. Only ANC and Nippon Keidanren were strongly opposed 
to the model because of which according to the model of influences these actors can be 
seen as defeated or unsuccessful.  
According to the regulatory space metaphor ANC and Nippon Keidanren can be seen 
as excluded from regulatory space, whereas majority of actors are included in the 
regulatory space (specifically actors having points 1 and above). No specific actor 
dominates the space for the ROU model. Moreover, it can be said that regulatory 
conversations from Nippon Keidanren and KASB that the model was too focused on the 
financial statement users did not get listened to by the IASB since the model did not 
change. Regulatory conversation from ANC that the model should have been classified 
based on the financial and operating leases also did not appear influential.  
Table 23. Influences on proposals of ROU Model 
 
INSTITUTION TYPE 
DP:  
Score 
ED:  
Score 
TOTAL 
1 EFRAG Regulator 0.5 1 1.5 
2 IOSCO Regulator 1 1 2 
3 Deloitte Accounting Firm 1 1 2 
4 EY Accounting Firm 1 0.5 1.5 
5 KPMG Accounting Firm 0 1 1 
6 PwC Accounting Firm 1 1 2 
7 UK FRC Standard-setter 1 1 2 
8 French ANC Standard-setter 0 0 0 
9 Italian OIC Standard-setter 1 0.5 1.5 
10 German DRSC Standard-setter 1 0.5 1.5 
11 Japanese ASBJ Standard-setter 0.5 1 1.5 
12 Australian AASB Standard-setter 0.5 0.5 1 
13 CFA Institute Profession 1 1 2 
14 Basel Regulator 0 1 1 
15 FEI Profession 1 1 2 
16 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm 1 0.5 1.5 
17 Korean KASB Standard-setter 1 0.5 1.5 
18 Nippon Keidanren Industry Organization 0 0 0 
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7.1.2. Lease Term 
To analyse the influential actors in the issue of lease term, Table 24 provides a useful 
starting point. The actors that at a single point were successful to influence the 
standard’s outcome were the ones with score of 2 at a single stage: EFRAG , Deloitte, 
EY, KPMG, PwC, FRC, ANC and FEI. Hence, EFRAG has significant powers, as well 
as Big Four, European standard-setters (FRC, ANC) and FEI as a representative of 
financial profession to give direction to the IASB’s work.  Among them Deloitte and FRC 
have twice been successful enough to have their proposals incorporated in the 
subsequent draft standards. Both Deloitte and FRC hold reward and expert power, 
which highlights their significance to the IASB. As French and Raven (1959) claim, the 
larger the basis of power is, the greater the power. Similarly, it could also be argued that 
having more than one basis power means holding greater power. Also, at the DP stage 
Deloitte and FRC bring illustrative examples regarding the failures of the IASB’s 
proposal and demonstrate how ‘more likely than not’ is superior to the ‘most likely lease 
term’. It could be suggested that not only the power sources of these actors are 
important but the arguments used to justify their positions and whether they are 
persuasive enough for the standard-setter. However, no such evidence is seen later for 
other successes. As seen in Chapter 6, comment letters to the DP reveal a great 
diversity of opinions. The components approach was the proposal that had been 
supported by the largest number of key actors. However, it may not have been 
successful since it was clearly against the interests of the IASB, which had indicated its 
preference for the options to be included in the ROU asset. Apart from components 
approach, no clear leading proposal could be seen. However, later during the standard-
setting process, the actors’ views became more aligned with one another, which can 
explain greater degree of influence exercised by the majority of actors. Since most 
respondents supported the lease term to be based on ‘reasonably certain’, the IASB 
went on compromise and stated that lease term would be based on ‘significant 
economic incentive’ which it claimed to be in essence very similar to ‘reasonably certain’ 
approach. Also, EY had shown support for ‘reasonably certain’ concept while explaining 
it with the term ‘significant economic incentive’. However, this decision met with criticism 
on the Re-ED stage again and even though the views of key actors were split between 
supporting the IASB’s suggested approach and ‘reasonably certain’ basis, the latter got 
incorporated in the standard. It can be said that EFRAG, Deloitte, KPMG, PwC, FRC, 
ANC, ASBJ and FEI were successful at the Re-ED stage and IOSCO, EY, DRSC, 
AASB, CFA Institute and KASB were not. While the successes at previous stages are 
important, it is evident that the success on the Re-ED stage is the most crucial, as it 
determines how the standard is eventually shaped. Interestingly, three out of Big Four 
audit firms were against the Re-ED proposal and supported the ‘reasonably certain’ 
concept. This could have been seen as one of the major influences as Big audit firms 
are closest to preparers, since they know how different accounting terms can represent 
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a burden to companies. Other influential actors on the Re-ED stage, such as EFRAG, 
FRC, ANC and ASBJ have regular dialogue with companies and represent interests of 
preparers as well as users, whereas FEI represents the interests of finance executives 
globally. While interests from stakeholders worldwide affected the IASB through 
Deloitte, KPMG, PwC and FEI on the lease term issue, some regional and national 
interests can also be distinguished, which are the interests of stakeholders of the UK, 
France and Japan through FRC, ANC and ASBJ, as well as the European Union 
through EFRAG. Those actors that did not influence the proposals include AASB and 
Basel Committee. Hence, it could be argued that the interests of Australian companies 
or the banking sector largely did not affect the lease term changes. The influence of 
IOSCO, DRSC and Nippon Keidanren can be identified as weak. While DRSC and 
Nippon did not express their views at all stages, IOSCO’s case seems special, since it 
partly supported the initial proposals of the IASB for the DP and ED and fully supported 
the proposal for the Re-ED. While it did not appear influential based on the one-
dimensional model of power, its interests overall do not seem to be in conflict with the 
IASB’s interests regarding the lease term. Since it mostly supported the lease term 
policies, it can be seen that IOSCO was not highly interested in the changes in the 
lease term; therefore, actors that had greater concerns with the policies received the 
IASB’s attention. It could also be suggested that such an alignment of IOSCO’s 
interests with the IASB’s interests could have been caused by the fact that IOSCO 
might have the possibility to influence the IASB’s work through means other than 
comment letters.  
Therefore, from this picture we can see that AASB and Basel Committee have been 
excluded from regulatory space. However, most key actors are definitely included in the 
regulatory space and voice their concerns. It can be argued that regulatory 
conversations from most actors that ‘significant economic incentives’ was a new and 
vague term for preparers got listened to by the IASB.  
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Table 24. Influences on proposals of lease term 
 
INSTITUTION TYPE 
DP:  
Score 
ED:  
Score 
Re-ED: Score 
TOTAL 
1 EFRAG Regulator 0.5 1 2 3.5 
2 IOSCO Regulator 0.5 0.5 0 1 
3 Deloitte Accounting Firm 2 1 2 5 
4 EY Accounting Firm 0 2 0 2 
5 KPMG Accounting Firm 1 1 2 4 
6 PwC Accounting Firm 1 1 2 4 
7 UK FRC Standard-setter 2 1 2 5 
8 French ANC Standard-setter 1 1 2 4 
9 Italian OIC Standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
10 German DRSC Standard-setter 1 0 0 1 
11 Japanese ASBJ Standard-setter 1 1 0.5 2.5 
12 Australian AASB Standard-setter 0 0 0 0 
13 CFA Institute Profession 0.5 1 0.5 2 
14 Basel Regulator 0 0 0 0 
15 FEI Profession 1 0.5 2 3.5 
16 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm 1 1 0 2 
17 Korean KASB Standard-setter 0.5 1 0 1.5 
18 Nippon Keidanren Industry Organization 0 1 0 1 
7.1.3. Short-term leases 
Since there was no question on short-term leases in the Re-ED, this section analyses 
the influences of actors on two stages of the standard-setting process. The actors with 
score 2 are seen to be most influential on the issue of short-term leases.  
EFRAG, Big Four firms and European standard-setters (FRC, ANC, OIC) have been 
most influential on the development of the short-term lease proposals. Regulatory 
conversations from actors that the standard did not provide enough relief for lessees 
and that recognition and measurement of short-term leases would represent a burden 
for preparers can be seen as having impact on the IASB. CFA Institute had no influence 
on the issue of short-term leases and its regulatory conversation towards the IASB that 
providing relief for short-term leases would provide for structuring possibilities did not 
get listened to. The standard changes in the area of short-term leases also follow the 
preferences of the majority of actors during each stage. In particular, after the DP 12 out 
of 18 actors supported capitalisation of short-term leases, which got reflected in the ED 
of the IASB, while after the ED 13 out of 18 actors opposed capitalisation of short-term 
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leases which resulted in the introduction of relief for short-term leases in the Re-ED. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the standard changes do not only depend on individual 
powerful actors, but on the collective action of these actors which is revealed through 
comment letters in their shared policy preferences.  
Table 25. Influences on proposals of short-term leases 
 
INSTITUTION TYPE 
DP - 
Score 
ED - 
Score 
TOTAL 
1 EFRAG Regulator 1 1 2 
2 IOSCO Regulator 1 0 1 
3 Deloitte Accounting Firm 1 1 2 
4 EY Accounting Firm 1 1 2 
5 KPMG Accounting Firm 1 1 2 
6 PwC Accounting Firm 1 1 2 
7 UK FRC Standard-setter 1 1 2 
8 French ANC Standard-setter 1 1 2 
9 Italian OIC Standard-setter 1 1 2 
10 German DRSC Standard-setter 1 0 1 
11 Japanese ASBJ Standard-setter 0 1 1 
12 Australian AASB Standard-setter 1 0 1 
13 CFA Institute Profession 0 0 0 
14 Basel Committee  Regulator 0 1 1 
15 FEI Profession 0 1 1 
16 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm 1 0 1 
17 Korean KASB Standard-setter 0 1 1 
18 Nippon Keidanren Industry Organization 0 1 1 
7.1.4. Dual Accounting Model 
The Dual Accounting Model introduced in the Re-ED was followed by critical comments 
from the key actors. All key actors except those that did not express their opinions (i.e. 
Basel Committee and Nippon Keidanren) affected the standard change in the area of  
the dual accounting. While some constituents favoured dual accounting though with 
further modifications, others were firm that they would only support a single accounting 
model. The latter were the most influential, as the dual accounting model was replaced 
by the single accounting model by the IASB. This topic is also particularly interesting, 
since the FASB retained the dual accounting model, and while this paper does not study 
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the influences on the FASB, it can be seen how the IASB is more influenced by these 
actors due to their coercive, reward and expert powers over the IASB. EFRAG, Deloitte, 
KPMG, FRC, DRSC and CFA Institute were influential on this issue as they supported 
the single accounting model. IOSCO only partly supported the dual as well as single 
accounting models and therefore, cannot be regarded as highly influential. Analysis of 
the most influential actors on dual accounting model identifies that interests of the 
European countries were important due to the success of EFRAG, FRC and DRSC. 
Interests of companies globally were reflected through the support of Deloitte, KPMG 
and CFA Institute.  
Table 26. Influences on proposals of dual accounting 
 
INSTITUTION TYPE 
Re-ED: 
Score 
1 EFRAG Regulator 2 
2 IOSCO Regulator 1 
3 Deloitte Accounting Firm 2 
4 EY Accounting Firm 1 
5 KPMG Accounting Firm 2 
6 PwC Accounting Firm 1 
7 UK FRC Standard-setter 2 
8 French ANC Standard-setter 1 
9 Italian OIC Standard-setter 1 
10 German DRSC Standard-setter 2 
11 Japanese ASBJ Standard-setter 1 
12 Australian AASB Standard-setter 0.5 
13 CFA Institute Profession 2 
14 Basel Committee Regulator 0 
15 FEI Profession 1 
16 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm 0.5 
17 Korean (KASB) Standard-setter 0.5 
18 Nippon Keidanren Industry Organization 0 
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7.2. Influences and Regulatory Space 
This section summarises the influences of key actors on the leasing standard-setting 
process. The scores are aggregated and most influential actors among 18 respondents 
can be identified.  
Table 27. Summary of influences on the leasing standard 
 
INSTITUTION TYPE ROU LT ST Dual TOTAL 
1 EFRAG Regulator 1.5 3.5 2 2 9 
2 IOSCO Regulator 2 1 1 1 5 
3 Deloitte Accounting Firm 2 5 2 2 11 
4 EY Accounting Firm 1.5 2 2 1 6.5 
5 KPMG Accounting Firm 1 4 2 2 9 
6 PwC Accounting Firm 2 4 2 1 9 
7 UK FRC Standard-setter 2 5 2 2 11 
8 French ANC Standard-setter 0 4 2 1 7 
9 Italian OIC Standard-setter 1.5 3 2 1 7.5 
10 German DRSC Standard-setter 1.5 1 1 2 5.5 
11 Japanese ASBJ Standard-setter 1.5 2.5 1 1 6 
12 Australian AASB Standard-setter 1 0 1 0.5 2.5 
13 CFA Institute Profession 2 2 0 2 6 
14 Basel Committee Regulator 1 0 1 0 2 
15 FEI Profession 2 3.5 1 1 7.5 
16 Grant Thornton Accounting Firm 1.5 2 1 0.5 5 
17 Korean KASB Standard-setter 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 4.5 
18 Nippon Keidanren Industry Organization 0 1 1 0 2 
 
Maximum scores per section >>> 2 6 2 2 12 
 
As Table 27 identifies, there were maximum 12 points that could have been gained by 
the actor who would have an influence on all topics. No such actor has been 
distinguished, however, there can be seen a variety in degrees of influence among 
different actors. To better identify some patterns, it was decided to group actors 
according to their degree of influence (Table 28). First, the actors were grouped in two 
categories: actors having more than 50% of scores (e.g. more than 6 out of 12 points) 
and less than 50% of scores on the focus areas. Actors who got more than 50% of 
scores were classed as actors with more than medium level of influence. Next, another 
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categorisation was undertaken in those two groups: actors with 75% or more points 
were distinguished as the ones with high influence, actors, with points from 50-75% as 
those with more than medium influence. Similarly, actors with 25% or more points up to 
50% of points were ones with medium influence, and actors with less than 25% of 
scores were identified as exercising only weak influence.  
Table 28. Classification of actors based on their influences 
(a) High (b) More than medium (c) Average (d) Weak 
>75% 50-75% 25-50% <25% 
 
Deloitte 
 
Italian OIC 
 
Japanese ASBJ 
 
Australian AASB 
UK FRC French ANC CFA Institute Basel Committee 
EFRAG FEI German DRSC Nippon Keidanren 
KPMG EY IOSCO 
 
PwC 
 
Grant Thornton 
 
  
Korean KASB 
 
 
Actors with high influences represent three types of respondents: accounting firms, a 
standard-setter and a regulator. It is particularly interesting why these specific actors 
have been most influential in the standard-setting process. As for Deloitte, KPMG and 
PwC, they represent three of Big Four firms with global presence in accounting and 
auditing arena. They have significant reward and expert power over IASB as examined 
in Chapter 4 and is also illustrated in Table 5. However, except employment ties with 
the IASB, they have acquired major technical expertise in dealing with accounting 
dilemmas. Based on regulatory space perspective corporations are major centres of 
expertise and therefore, their involvement in the regulatory process is a precondition of  
its success, which is evident on the case of Deloitte’s, KPMG’s and PwC’s activity in the 
standard-setting process. Therefore, reward and expert power of these firms could have 
contributed to their actual influences on the IASB. While FRC represents a national 
standard-setter, it is no less influential than the above firms. Its power sources also 
stem from significant reward and expert power. Moreover, it submitted 5 comment 
letters to the IASB in total, compared to most other actors who only submitted maximum 
of 3 comment letters (e.g. 1 for each stage). This might point to its significant interest in 
standard-setting as well as could increase its perceived expertise for the IASB since the 
time between different stages of the due process such as ED and Re -ED was long 
enough to allow for changes of positions for the IASB which would be in need of further 
expert advice during these processes. EFRAG is a special actor among those that hold 
high influence, as it has access to all coercive, reward and expert powers through its 
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organizational affi liation to the European Commission. Since coercive power represents 
one of the most crucial power sources over the IASB, it is not surprising that EFRAG’s 
views are mostly incorporated into the standard or determine the directions in standard 
changes. It has been emphasized by many authors that the IASB’s emergence as a 
global accounting standard-setter has largely been due to the EU’s support and 
adoption of their accounting standards, due to which the European Union has significant 
influence on the IASB. This finding from previous studies is confirmed in this paper.  
The second largest group of influential actors consists of OIC, ANC, FEI and EY. The 
influence of EY on the standard-setting can be explained by similar reasons as that of 
other Big Four firms, although it is surprising why EY did not turn out as influential as 
other three audit firms. It could be attributable to its unclear position regarding certain 
issues, and could be suggested that clear articulation of p references might be affecting 
the outcomes of regulation. OIC and ANC are European standard-setters and represent 
interests of French and Italian stakeholders. Since OIC and ANC represent countries 
where continental accounting traditions prevail, it would be logical to think that DRSC, 
as a standard-setter of Germany and representative of continental accounting system 
would have similar level of influence. However, DRSC does not fund the IASB and only 
has employment relationship with them and therefore, the presence of less resources 
most likely contributes to less influence. Another influential actor with more than 
medium influence is FEI which submitted 8 comment letters in total for three stages of 
public consultation of the IASB. It can be concluded that financial executives worldwide 
have substantial interest in standard-setting and their opinions are taken into account by 
the IASB to a great extent.  
The actors with medium influence do not necessarily demonstrate shared 
characteristics for which they could be thought to exercise less influence than actors in 
first two groups. A case requiring particular emphasis is that of IOSCO, as previous 
literature identifies it as a highly powerful actor with regards to international standard-
setting. It also has access to coercive and expert powers and it seems that these 
powers do not contribute to high degrees of influence from IOSCO. However, as 
outlined above, the organization’s views were in many cases in line with the IASB’s 
existing views and though their expressed opinions did not affect standard change 
directions as much, IOSCO still seemed quite content with any such change at the next 
stage of the due process. IOSCO has 8 employment relationships with the IASB, which 
is much higher than average ties held by other key actors. Therefore, it could be 
suggested IOSCO has significantly more opportunities to incorporate its views in the 
standard than others without having to articulate all its interests in public comment 
letters. Therefore, some invisible influences can also be in place. 
The weakest group in terms of influence includes Australian AASB, Nippon Keidanren 
and Basel Committee. Since the latter two did not submit comment letters at all stages, 
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their low influence on the standard is not unexpected. As for AASB, it is not evident why 
they are not successful in the standard-setting process. It can be identified though that 
AASB only holds reward power and not expert power, which might be the encumbrance 
for its success in the standard-setting process. 
It cannot be argued that any of the above organizations has been driven by their 
‘private’ interests; rather Big Audit firms are portrayed as those acting interests of their 
clients, e.g. preparers and users, whereas FRC as a standard-setter represents the 
British firms’ interests and EFRAG represents European Union’s firms’ interests. 
Therefore, public-private distinction is hard to draw which is characteristic of economic 
regulation under advanced capitalism. Based on this study’s results and in line with the 
regulatory space metaphor, the most dominant actors are powerful and sophisticated 
organizations. This is especially evident in an international context of accounting 
standard-setting, which increases the presence of large international organizations in 
the regulatory activities and gives rise to greater conflicts of opinion.  
To better understand the regulatory space of the leasing standard-setting relations 
between occupants of this space are important to discuss. Chapter 4 has discussed 
organizational and employment relationships among key actors. Organizational 
relationships distinguished significant relationships among monitoring board member 
organizations. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding their significance in 
the regulatory space of standard-setting based on this study, since SEC and FSA Japan 
though identified among key actors did not submit comment letters and did not 
participated in the due process. While Basel Committee, IOSCO and EC (through 
EFRAG) participated in the due process, their degrees of influence vary. Hence, it 
cannot be clearly identified to what level organizational relationships among monitoring 
board members represents an influencing factor on the standard-setting process. 
Employment relationships, on the other hand, demonstrate interesting patterns, since 
majority of these relationships include one of the Big Four audit firms and some other 
key actor, pointing to the fact that it is mostly Big Four’s employees that are regarded to 
have expert knowledge on accounting matters and are invited to serve on committees 
or boards of various standard-setting organizations, such as FRC UK, FRC Australia 
and others. From employment relationships connections between EFRAG and national 
standard-setters FRC, ANC and OIC are identified and as EFRAG is one of the most 
influential bodies, extent of employment relationships can be suggested to influence the 
outcomes of the standard-setting process. However, more research is required to make 
any conclusions regarding the correlation between such relationships and successful 
exercise of power. Outcomes of regulatory struggles in the leasing process identified 
most influential actors, and the examination of the resources used in these struggles 
pointed out that most influential actors usually hold more than one source of power, as 
well as hold significant relationships with other key actors. The leasing standard-setting 
as a regulatory space is unevenly divided among actors: there are major participants 
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(Table 28, columns a and b) and minor participants (Table 28, columns c and d). No key 
actor seems to be excluded completely, although for certain issues it can be seen that 
some of the actors are not included in the regulatory space, as for instance, AASB was 
excluded for the topic of the lease term, or CFA Institute for the topic of short-term 
leases. The same is visible for certain stages of the standard-setting process, however, 
as identified most important is the inclusion in the regulatory space during the Re-ED 
stage or the stage when the issue is finalized.  
It has been seen that the regulatory space of the leasing standard has also been 
characterized by inclusion and exclusion of the issues. While the standard has its formal 
structure and should consist of issues such as recognition, measurement, presentation 
and others, it can be identified that some issues become particularly significant at some 
stages whereas later they leave the space. This can be said for the ROU model, which 
was a highly debated topic in the DP and ED stages, whereas there was no more  
question in Re-ED regarding this model, which means that the topic had left the space. 
Similarly, short-term leases had occupied the regulatory space for the DP and ED 
stages, whereas dual accounting model only entered the space at the Re-ED stage. 
The issue of the lease term in contrast remained in the regulatory space throughout the 
standard-setting process, which implies that it was a highly significant topic for the 
respondents. As for the absence of the topics of the ROU model and short -term leases 
from the last stage, it might indicate that the key actors were largely satisfied with the 
achieved results. Therefore, it can be concluded that the involvement of the key actors 
at significant points in time can substantially alter the direction of the standard 
development. 
Overall, much of the development of the standard has been in favour of preparers. The 
ROU model requires all lease liabilities to be shown on the balance sheet, which 
represented a negative change for lessees and lessors but the IASB’s decision on it 
was not altered. However, other key issues demonstrate significant dynamics. For the 
lease term, the high threshold was introduced, which allowed preparers to recognize 
less options on the balance sheet. The exclusion for short-term leases also brought 
relief to preparers. The rejection of dual accounting model also reduced the costs of 
applying the lease standard in the financial accounts for preparers. From this and the 
above analysis we can conclude that whatever direction the standard change took, the 
key actors were always involved in this modification and at least some of them highly 
influenced the due process of the leasing standard development.  
7.3. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter the empirical data was analyzed applying the one-dimensional model of 
power, as a result of which ‘successes’ and ‘defeats’ of key actors for each of the focus 
areas were distinguished. Chapter 7 also summarized key actors’ influences and 
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analyzed them using the concept of regulatory space. The major findings will be further 
presented in the following chapter, where conclusions will be drawn regarding the study.  
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8. Conclusions  
This thesis distinguishes the major actors in the IASB’s standard-setting process, 
specifically, for the leasing standard and identifies their degree of influence on the due 
process. By applying the power sources model the study finds that the key actors, i.e. 
those with coercive, expert or reward power over the IASB are various regulators, 
standard-setters, accounting firms and several representatives from profession and 
industry. Actors that have the potential to influence the IASB are both national and 
international actors. Among international actors EU, IOSCO and Big Four Audit firms 
can be distinguished, whereas national actors mainly include national standard-setters, 
such as UK FRC, French ANC and others.  
The second part of the research question examines if it is possible to identify whether 
some of the key actors are more successful than others. By applying the one-
dimensional model of power the study finds that there are distinguishable actors that 
consistently influence the leasing standard-setting process. Among the most influential 
actors the following are identified: Deloitte, UK FRC, EFRAG, KPMG and PwC. 
Following the regulatory space theory, the levels of influence of specific actors are 
linked with the resources they hold in the standard-setting process. All these 
organizations hold reward and expert power over the IASB, whereas EFRAG 
additionally holds coercive power over the IASB. It is further suggested that the more 
bases of power the actor holds, the more influential can it be in the standard-setting 
process. Further, it is discussed that the successful influence of actors on the IASB 
implies that the interests of these actors are taken into account during the standard-
setting process. It is concluded that the firms’ interests globally through Big Four are 
considered by the IASB, as well as stakeholders’ interests in the UK and the EU are 
prioritised by the IASB. The findings regarding the significance of EFRAG and Big Four 
firms are in line with the previous literature. However, one of the unexpected results was 
that of IOSCO which only appeared influential at a medium level, which was in 
contradiction with prior literature which distinguished IOSCO as the highly influential 
actor. It could be suggested that IOSCO might be having covert influences rather than 
visible influences in the standards, since it did not object to many of the IASB’s 
proposals. Besides, significant organizational relationships are found among monitoring 
board members, some of which also represent key actors. No specific conclusions can 
be drawn regarding their influence, although, covert influences could be in place. 
Nevertheless, this study only focuses on overt influences seen through the comment 
letters. On the other hand, it is found that employment relationships do contribute to the 
greater degrees of success of actors that are sources of these relationships, i.e. whose 
employees occupy the boards and committees of other organizations. 
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The study concludes that the leasing standard-setting process is unevenly divided 
among the key actors, as there are major and minor participants. Although some key 
actors are excluded from this space for certain issues or stages, no actor seems to be 
outside this regulatory space when considering the overall due process. It is also 
distinguished that some issues enter and leave the space and that the involvement and 
positions of the key actors at such strategic times can dramatical ly affect the standard 
development.  
Most of the change in the key issues of the leasing standard has happened in favour of 
preparers, while the ROU model puts more burden on preparers. This thesis concludes 
that regardless of the direction of the changes in the standard, many of the key actors 
have majorly determined the development of the leasing standard.  
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9. Reflections  
This thesis provides evidence regarding the key actors in the IASB standard-setting 
process and distinguishes their influences on the due process based on the case of the 
lease standard. This study distinguishes successful actors among the chosen 
respondents. However, discussion of one case represents a limitation to possibilities of 
generalization of findings, since the interests of key actors may vary for different 
standards and their influences might seem low when in fact they may not have interest 
in specific standard development. Also, the case of lease accounting affects the choice 
of key actors as one of the IASB’s affiliated bodies considered when identifying actors 
with expert power was Leases Working Group. Working groups are set up differently for  
each standard and can include representatives from companies other than those 
chosen for Leases Working Group and although the cut-off of 2 employees represents a 
control against such variations, for cases of other standards some different actors might 
have be identified.  
Nonetheless, the limitation of a single case study can give rise to future research 
possibilities where the model identified in this paper can be applied to other standards 
as well and consequently, general trends can be distinguished. Besides, we only 
analyze formal means of participation in the standard-setting process based on the 
comment letters and to have a more complete view, other influences could also be 
considered through actors’ participation in roundtable meetings with the IASB. 
Nevertheless, we are aware that covert influences may also be present, which is 
impossible to dismiss in any studies of power and influence. 
A further limitation to this paper is the one-dimensional view of power taken. While this 
view was chosen due to the resource constraints, we acknowledge that the 
consideration of the three-dimensional view of power could have presented a more 
complete picture of the standard-setting process. It would especially be interesting for 
further researchers to study whether and to what extent the identified actors can 
influence others’ wants and whether they can promote certain accounting ideologies 
and determine whether conflicts of opinions actually arise or not. Similarly, it could be 
researched whether these actors’ interests are themselves shaped by ideologies 
affecting social preferences. In particular, when actors take certain positions, is it their 
conscious choice or the consequence of influencing ideologies?  
Further research opportunities can be seen regarding the technical arguments used by 
actors for justifying their position. Such a study would provide possibilities to distinguish 
to what extent it is the sources of power used that influences the standard outcomes 
and whether presented arguments also affect the directions in the standard changes.  
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As for the use of the regulatory space concept, it allows us to see that many actors are 
involved and attempting to influence the regulatory space, however, it is not clear who 
the most influential actors are in the due process only using this theory which needs to 
be complemented with additional theory of power in order to successfully identify actors’ 
influences. Moreover, the regulatory space involves studying the context in which 
regulation takes place; however, there are no clear boundaries or guidance regarding 
the extent to which the dimensions of the regulatory space should be outlined.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by developing the method for applying the power 
sources model specifically for key actor identification in the accounting standard-setting 
based on the social power model of French and Raven (1959). Furthermore, this paper 
contributes by outlining a new approach to analyse standard-setting; specifically, the 
coding system developed in this study involves a rather detailed method which can 
identify different degrees of influences that actors can have on the standard which 
represents a superior method to the ones generally applied in standard-setting where 
influences are grouped in only two categories. Therefore, our thesis suggests a deep 
analysis of comment letters to identify positions and their degrees of 
opposition/agreement with the standard-setter’s proposals.  
Another contribution of this thesis is that it examines all stages of the leasing standard-
setting process. The advantage of this is that influences at all stages can be identified 
and the overall success of actors can be identified. Based on the discussion, it can be 
seen that missing of one of the stages such as ED or Re-ED could have given a 
different picture, since some actors might have appeared more influential than they are 
and vice versa. The inclusion of the Re-ED stage in the study is especially important, 
since as the results show major changes can take place at this stage and not discussing 
this stage could obscure the findings.  
For further research the robustness of the suggested model could be tested by 
undertaking quantitative studies in the literature of political influences in accounting 
standard-setting. Also a quantitative approach for analyzing comment letters could be 
followed in order to systematically code and sort opinions and arguments and compare 
to the final standards. It could specifically be examined to which degree the key actors 
can drive the changes in standards compared to groups of preparers, users, etc. As the 
thesis identifies key actors as influential participants of regulatory space and as many 
studies are devoted to the analysis of corporate comment letters, it would be interesting 
to research whether preparers can actually influence any standards without the support 
of the key actors on specific topics.  
Finally, we would like to conclude that undertaking studies in this field will identify many 
unexplored questions and any future researchers will be met with delightful 
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opportunities to further develop this field of accounting and contribute to the literature, 
as well as wider society. 
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Appendix A 
The Organizational Structure of the IASB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on Deloitte, 2015e. 
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IFRS Foundation 
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Appendix B 
Key players in the IASB standard-setting process. 
 
Abbreviation Title Members Objective / mission Interest 
EC 
European 
Commission 
28 Commissioners, 
one from each EU 
member country 
Strives to represent and 
support the interests of 
the EU as a whole as 
well as oversee and 
implement EU policies  
New accounting standard are 
endorsed by EC, if it satisfies 
all European stakeholders // 
The major financial supporter // 
Has 2 members in IASB 
structure // No comment letters 
were submitted 
IOSCO 
International 
Organization of 
Securities 
Commission 
Association of 124 
national securities 
commissions, 15 
international standard-
setting bodies and 64 
other than 
governmental 
organizations with 
interest in securities 
regulation 
By providing high quality 
technical assistance, 
education and training to 
its members and other 
regulators, it seeks to 
build sound global 
capital markets and a 
robust global regulatory 
framework 
Due to the primary objective, 
IOSCO strives to protect 
investors and ensure that they 
are able to get a complete 
view of company’s economic 
reality // Has 8 members in 
IASB structure // Submitted 3 
comment letters  
U.S. SEC 
U.S. Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission 
Various self-regulatory 
organizations and 
other federal agencies, 
state securities 
regulators, 
international securities 
agencies and law 
enforcement agencies 
Seeks to protect 
investors, maintain fair 
and efficient markets as 
well as facilitate capital 
formation 
Strives that changes would be 
made to the existing lease 
standard in order to ensure 
greater transparency in 
financial reporting // Has 3 
members in IASB structure // 
No comment letters were 
submitted 
DTTL 
Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu 
Limited 
Globally connected 
network of member 
firms in more than 150 
countries  
Focuses to engage with 
regulators and other 
stakeholders worldwide 
in order to promote 
reforms that improve 
quality for all parties  
Represents the common 
interest of profession and firms 
on an international level // One 
of the major financial 
supporter’s // Has 3 members 
in IASB structure // Submitted 
3 comment letters  
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PwC 
Pricewaterhouse
Coopers 
Globally connected 
network of member 
firms in 157 countries  
Aims to work closely 
with clients and 
communities in order to 
build trust in society and 
solve important 
problems 
Represents the common 
interest of profession and firms 
on an international level // One 
of the major financial 
supporter’s // Has 3 members 
in IASB structure // Submitted 
3 comment letters  
EY 
Ernst & Young 
Global Limited 
Globally connected 
network of member 
firms in more than 150 
countries  
Aims to deliver high 
quality services as well 
as build trust and 
confidence in the world’s 
capital markets and 
economies  
Represents the common 
interest of profession and firms 
on an international level // One 
of the major financial 
supporter’s // Has 3 members 
in IASB structure // Submitted 
3 comment letters  
KPMG 
KPMG 
International 
Globally connected 
network of member 
firms in 155 countries  
Aims to work 
strategically with all 
stakeholders to fulfill a 
greater sense of 
purpose 
Represents the common 
interest of profession and firms 
on an international level // One 
of the major financial 
supporter’s // Has 3 members 
in IASB structure // Submitted 
3 comment letters  
GTIL 
Grant Thorton 
International 
Globally connected 
network of member 
firms in more than 130 
countries  
Strives for best practice 
in governance 
arrangements in order to 
fulfil regulators and 
investors concerns 
Represents the common 
interest of profession and firms 
on an international level // 
Financial supporter // Has 2 
members in IASB structure // 
Submitted 3 comment letters  
FRC 
UK Financial 
Reporting 
Council  
The Board composes 
of members from 
different backgrounds 
Seeks to promote high 
quality corporate 
governance and 
reporting in order to 
foster investment  
Tries to influence 
developments of issues that 
affect stakeholders in the UK 
and internationally // Financial 
supporter // Has 1 members in 
IASB structure // Submitted 5 
comment letters  
ANC 
French Ministry 
of Finance 
All financial authorities 
in a country  
Aims to provide 
guidance on all 
legislative or regulatory 
provisions issued by 
national authorities 
which include 
accounting measures  
Represents the interest of 
France industry in the 
international arena // Financial 
supporter // Has 1 members in 
IASB structure // Submitted 2 
comment letters  
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OIC 
Organismo 
Italiano di 
Contabilita 
Italian organizations 
which largely 
represent the 
interested parties in 
the accounting matters  
Seeks to represent the 
private and public 
interests to accounting 
standards and ensure 
that its activities as 
national standard setter 
are respected 
Represent and voice national 
opinions on accounting 
matters // Financial supporter // 
Has 1 members in IASB 
structure // Submitted 3 
comment letters  
ASCG / DRSC 
Accounting 
Standards 
Committee 
Germany 
Association of publicly 
and non-publicly 
traded companies, 
banks, insurance 
undertakings, the 
accounting and 
auditing profession in 
Germany  
Seeks to promote the 
continued improvement 
in accounting and 
financial reporting as 
well as ensure that the 
German Federal 
Government supports its 
objectives and listens to 
its expert advice 
Represents the interest of 
German industry in the 
international arena // Has 1 
members in IASB structure // 
Submitted 3 comment letters  
ASBJ/ FASF 
Financial 
Accounting 
Standards 
Foundation 
(Japan) 
The Board composes 
of members from 
different backgrounds 
Aims to encourage the 
progress of corporate 
finance disclosure and 
security of the capital 
markets in Japan by 
developing generally 
accepted accounting 
standards  
Strives for the development of 
global accounting standards // 
One of the main financial 
supporter’s // Submitted 3 
comment letters  
AASB 
Financial 
Reporting 
Council 
Australia 
The Board composes 
of members from 
different backgrounds 
Seeks to provide broad 
oversight of the 
standard setting 
processes in accounting 
and ensure its high 
quality  
Represents public interest in 
the context of the Australian 
economy // Financial supporter 
// Has no members in IASB 
structure // Submitted 3 
comment letters  
CPA Canada 
Chartered 
Professional 
Accountants of 
Canada 
40 accounting bodies 
in Canada 
Aims to enhance the 
influence, significance 
and value of the 
Canadian CPA 
profession 
Represents members opinion 
and acts according to their 
interest // Financial supporter // 
Has no members in IASB 
structure // No comment letters 
were submitted 
- CFA Institute 
Global network of 
more than 125,000 
investment 
professionals  
Seeks to lead the 
investment profession 
globally by promoting 
the highest standards of 
ethics, education and 
professional excellence 
for the society benefit  
Strives that new leases 
standard enable different 
market participants better 
assess the lease obligation // 
Has 4 members in IASB 
structure // Submitted 3 
comment letters  
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- 
AngloGold 
Ashanti  
Has 20 gold mining 
operations in 10 
countries, 4 regions 
Aims to create value for 
shareholders, 
employees,  business 
and social partners 
through safely and 
responsibly exploring, 
mining and marketing 
their products 
Advice and provide input into 
proposals that the IASB is 
developing // Has 2 members 
in IASB structure // No 
comment letters were 
submitted 
AMF 
Autorite des 
Marches 
Financiers 
(France) 
French financial 
markets participants, 
including: market 
infrastructures, listed 
companies, financial 
intermediaries and etc. 
Strives to safeguard 
investments in financial 
products by improving 
investor protection and 
maintain orderly 
financial markets 
Represents members opinion 
and acts according to their 
interest // Has 2 members in 
IASB structure // No comment 
letters were submitted 
BCBS 
Basel Committee 
on Banking 
Supervision 
Central banks and  
organizations with 
direct banking 
supervisory authority 
Strives to improve the 
quality of banking 
supervision worldwide 
and enhance financial 
stability 
Represent interest of banking 
industry // Has 2 members in 
IASB structure // Submitted 1 
comment letter 
FEI  
Financial 
Executives 
International 
More than 10,000 
best-in-the-business 
members  
Seeks to be recognized 
globally as the leading 
organization for senior-
level financial 
executives  
Provide authoritative 
representation of members 
interests // Has 2 members in 
IASB structure // Submitted 7 
comment letters  
FSA 
Japan Financial 
Services Agency 
Japanese private 
sector institutions, 
Financial Instrument 
Business Operators 
and market 
participants 
Aims to ensure Japan 
financial system’s 
stability, protect 
depositors, policy 
holders and securities 
investors as well as 
establish fair and 
transparent financial 
market  
Participate in an international 
standard-setting process in 
order to develop internationally 
consistent financial 
administration // Has 2 
members in IASB structure // 
No comment letters were 
submitted 
KASB 
Korea 
Accounting 
Standards Board 
14 Korean 
organizations, such as 
Korean Institute of 
Certified Public 
Accountants, Korea 
Exchange, Korea 
Federation of Banks 
and etc. 
Seeks to improve the 
quality of the Korean 
accounting standards 
which fit to Korean 
economic circumstances  
Participate in the IASB's 
activities with regard to reflect 
the demands of Korean 
constituents on the IFRS // 
Has 2 members in IASB 
structure // Submitted 3 
comment letters  
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Keidanren 
Nippon 
Keidanren 
(Japan Business 
Federation) 
1,309 representative 
companies of Japan, 
112 nationwide 
industrial associations 
and 47 regional 
economic 
organizations 
Aims to support 
corporate activities 
which contribute to the 
self-sustaining 
development of the 
Japanese economy and 
quality improvement of 
people’s life 
Advice and provide input into 
proposals that the IASB is 
developing // Has 2 members 
in IASB structure // Submitted 
1 comment letter 
FAF 
US Financial 
Accounting 
Foundation 
14-18 Trustees from 
organizations which 
have interest in 
financial reporting, 
such as American 
Accounting 
Association, CFA 
Institute and etc. 
Strives to establish and 
improve financial 
accounting and 
reporting standards, 
stimulate financial 
reporting which provides 
useful information to 
investors and other 
users of financial reports 
in order to make 
decisions  
Strives that users of financial 
statements would have a 
complete and understandable 
picture of an organization’s 
leasing activities // One of the 
major financial supporter’s // 
No  members in IASB structure 
// No comment letters were 
submitted 
MinFin 
Ministry of 
Finance of the 
Russian 
Federation 
19 departments, such 
as Department of 
International Financial 
Relations, Legal 
Department and etc. 
Seeks to ensure good 
governance of the 
Russian Federation 
public financial system 
Represent the Russian 
Federation interest in IFRS // 
The financial supporter // Has 
no  members in IASB structure 
// No comment letters were 
submitted 
 
Sources: Hoogervorst, 2014; IOSCO, 2015; EU, n.d.; SEC, 2013; Deloitte, 2015; KPMG, 2015; 
EY, 2015; PwC, 2015; GTIL, 2014; ASCG, 2014; FEI, n.d.; BCBS, 2013; FSA, 2015; KASB, 
2008a; KASB, 2008b; AngloGold Ashanti, 2014; Keidanren, 2014; FAF, n.d.; CFA, 2015; FRC, 
2015; OIC, 2015; CPA, 2015; AMF, 2013; Minfin, 2014; FASF, 2001; AASB, 2015; ANC, n.d. 
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Appendix C 
No. Key Issues IAS 17 DP ED Re-ED Expected Standard Consequence 
ROU 
Lessee 
Accounting 
Model: Right-of-
Use Model 
Finance leases 
capitalised and 
operating leases 
disclosed 
All leases 
capitalized 
All leases 
capitalized 
All leases capitalized All leases capitalized No change 
1 
Initial 
Measurement 
of lease assets 
and liabilities 
FL: fair value of the 
leased property or, 
cost, discounted 
using the interest 
rate implicit 
in the lease or if not 
practical,  
incremental 
borrowing rate 
OL: n/a 
cost, discounted 
using the lessee's 
incremental 
borrowing rate 
cost, 
incremental 
borrowing rate 
or the rate 
lessor charges 
the lessee 
cost, incremental 
borrowing rate or the 
rate lessor charges the 
lessee 
cost, incremental 
borrowing rate (further 
clarified) or the rate 
lessor charges the 
lessee (rate implicit in 
the lease); include initial 
direct costs of the lessor 
in determining the rate 
implicit in the lease 
Added lessor's 
charging rate as an 
alternative, no 
significant changes 
2 
Standard 
Scope: Non-
core Leases 
not specified undecided inclusion inclusion inclusion No change 
3 
Standard 
Scope: Short-
term Leases 
not specified undecided 
inclusion 
(simplified: not 
discounting) 
voluntary capitalization 
(e.g. choice between 
capitalization and 
recording as 
expenditure is 
possible) 
voluntary capitalization 
(e.g. choice between 
capitalization and 
recording as 
expenditure is possible) 
Proposed 
capitalization for 
short-term leases 
first but later allowed 
voluntary 
capitalization 
4 
Lease Payment 
Components: 
Purchase 
Options 
Minimum lease 
payments (only 
concerning FL) 
include: purchase 
options if bargain 
purchase 
Minimum lease 
payments include: 
purchase options 
(similar to renewal 
options) only if 
likely to be 
exercised 
Minimum lease 
payments 
exclude 
purchase 
options (the 
lease contract is 
supposed 
ceased when 
purchase option 
is undertaken) 
Minimum lease 
payments include: 
purchase options if 
significant economic 
incentive to exercise 
option is present 
(depending on the 
factors) 
Include: if it is 
reasonably certain that 
the lessee will exercise 
the option having 
considered the relevant 
economic factors 
(purchase options 
should be treated 
similarly as other 
options) 
Sudden change in 
ED proposing to 
exclude purchase 
options, other papers 
all propose inclusion, 
gives rise to 
increased assets and 
liabilities to be 
recognised 
compared to IAS 17 
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5 
Lease Payment 
Components: 
Contingent 
Rentals (later 
called Variable 
Lease 
Payments) 
Minimum lease 
payments exclude 
contingent rent 
Minimum lease 
payments include 
amounts payable 
under contingent 
rental 
arrangements 
Include in 
minimum lease 
payments: 
determine the 
amount by 
forward rates / 
indices or 
prevailing rates 
/indices 
Include in minimum 
lease payments: if 
based on index or rate 
(measure using the 
index or rate at lease 
commencement) 
Include in minimum 
lease payments: if 
based on index or rate 
(measure using the 
index or rate at lease 
commencement) 
Limited the inclusion 
of contingent rentals 
to those that are 
based on an index or 
a rate 
6 Lease Term 
Recognition over 
non-cancellable 
term; examining 
bargain purchases  
Recognition over 
most likely term: 
Inclusion of 
renewal options 
Recognition 
over most likely 
term: Inclusion 
of renewal 
options  
Recognition over non-
cancellable period of 
the lease; Inclusion of 
renewal options (if 
significant econ. 
incentive) 
Recognition over a high 
threshold if significant 
econ. Incentive is 
expected to be realized,  
(if reasonably certain 
that it will exercise 
option) 
Started from 
inclusion of all 
renewal options of 
the most likely term 
but later added the 
words 'significant 
economic incentives ' 
further amending it to 
the phrase 
'reasonably certain to 
exercise' 
7 
Reassessment 
of Components 
and Lease Term 
Not required unless 
specified conditions 
are met (e.g. terms 
of the lease are 
changed) 
Required at each 
reporting date for 
lease payment 
components and 
lease term on the 
basis of any new 
facts or 
circumstances 
Required at 
each reporting 
date for lease 
payment 
components and 
lease term, if 
events indicate 
significant 
change in 
carrying value 
Required at each 
reporting date for 
lease payment 
components and lease 
term, if events indicate 
significant change in 
carrying value; for 
contingent rentals at 
each reporting date 
Reassess the lease 
term only upon the 
occurrence of a 
significant event or a 
significant change in 
circumstances that are 
within the control of the 
lessee; for contingent 
rentals - when the 
lessee remeasures the 
lease liability for other 
reasons or when there is 
a change in the cash 
flows resulting from a 
change in the reference 
index or rate 
Softened the 
requirements for the 
reassessment of the 
lease term, since the 
lessees are not 
required to reassess 
the lease term at 
each reporting date 
but only when 
significant events 
occur 
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8 
Subsequent 
Measurement 
Applying amortized 
cost-based 
approach on both 
lease asset and 
lease liability (for 
FLs) 
Applying 
amortized cost-
based approach 
for both lease 
asset and lease 
liability 
Applying 
amortized cost-
based approach 
for both; - Lease 
asset: Assets 
may be 
impaired; 
exception if IAS 
40 is applied 
(fair value model 
for investment 
property) 
Applying amortized 
cost-based approach 
for both; - Lease asset: 
Assets may be 
impaired (exception for 
investment property)  
Type A leases: 
amortise according to 
the pattern in 
which the lessee 
expects to consume 
the right -of-use asset’s 
future economic 
benefits. 
Type B: amortise ROU 
on a straight-line basis 
Applying amortized cost-
based approach for 
both; - Lease asset: 
Assets may be impaired 
(exception for 
investment property)  
Type A leases: amortise 
according to the pattern 
in 
which the lessee 
expects to consume the 
right-of-use asset’s 
future economic 
benefits. 
No change (only 
temporary change 
due to dual 
accounting model) 
9 
Dual 
Accounting 
Model 
(treatment of 
leases in 
income 
statement) 
N/A none none 
Type A leases: interest 
and amortisation 
separately (e.g. 
finance) 
Type B: single lease 
cost incl. both interest 
cost and amortisation 
(e.g. operating) 
All Type A: recognize 
amortisation of the ROU 
asset separately from 
interest on the lease 
liability 
Introduced dual 
model on Re-ED 
level but then 
switched to single 
model while FASB 
maintained dual 
accounting model  
10 
Presentation: 
Balance Sheet 
No separation of 
lease asset & lease 
liability 
Separation of 
lease assets from 
other assets in 
BS; No separation 
requirements for 
lease liabilities  
Separation of 
lease assets & 
liabilities in BS 
Separation of lease 
asset & liability in BS 
or disclosures 
Separation of lease 
asset & liability in BS or 
disclosures  
Required separation 
of lease assets and 
liabilities in BS and 
later softened this 
requirement and also 
allowed disclosures  
11 
Presentation: 
Income 
Statement 
No separation of 
related income 
statement items 
No preliminary 
views 
Separation of 
lease 
amortization & 
interest 
expenses, either 
in IS or 
disclosures  
Type A: Separation of 
lease amortization & 
interest expenses in  
disclosures  
Type B: Single lease 
expense in disclosures  
Separation of lease 
amortization & interest 
expenses in disclosures  
Only disclosure of 
the expense is 
required and it is no 
more an option to 
separately show 
lease expense in IS 
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12 
Presentation: 
Cash Flow 
Statement 
No separation of 
cash flow items 
No preliminary 
views 
Lease payments 
classified under 
financing 
activities  
Lease payments 
classified under 
financing activities for 
Type A; under 
operating activities for 
Type B 
Lease payments 
classified within 
operating or financing 
activities  
consistent with the 
entity’s policy election 
under 
IAS 7 
Allowed presentation 
also under operating 
activities  
13 Disclosures 
- Nature of lease 
arrangements 
- Existence of 
options (purchase 
and renewal)  
- Reconciliation of 
opening/closing 
balances 
- Restrictions 
imposed by lease 
arrangements 
- Contingent rentals 
expensed in last 
period 
- Amount and 
timing of future 
cash flows 
No preliminary 
views 
- Nature of lease 
arrangements; - 
Existence of 
options 
(purchase and 
renewal); - Initial 
direct costs; - 
Reconciliation of 
opening/closing 
balances of 
lease assets 
and lease 
liabilities; - Basis 
for contingent 
rentals;   
- Amount and 
timing of future 
cash flows  
- Assumptions 
and judgements 
(renewal 
options, 
contingent 
rentals, etc.) - 
Restrictions 
imposed by 
lease 
arrangements 
A disclosure objective 
that it should be 
possible for users to 
assess the amount, 
timing, and uncertainty 
of cash flows arising 
from leases;  
A lessee shall consider 
the level of detail 
necessary to satisfy 
the disclosure 
objective; 
Requirements: 
- Nature of lease 
arrangements; - Basis 
for variable lease 
payments; -
Reconciliation of 
opening/closing 
balances of lease 
assets/liabilities; - 
Maturity analysis of the 
lease liability  
A disclosure objective 
maintained; The IASB 
decided not to retain the 
qualitative disclosure 
requirements proposed 
in the 2013 ED and, 
instead, require a lessee 
to disclose sufficient 
additional information to 
satisfy the overall 
disclosure objective.  
The IASB decided not to 
retain the requirement 
for reconciliation of 
opening/closing 
balances of lease assets 
& liabilities; 
Quantitative disclosures: 
amortisation, interest, 
short-term leases 
expense, etc. 
Disclosures should be 
presented in a tabular 
format  
Introduced more 
detailed 
requirements on the 
Re-ED stage but 
later moved towards 
a more principle-
based requirement 
for qualitative 
disclosures, while it 
also made 
clarifications on 
quantitative 
disclosures by 
requiring specific 
disclosures. 
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14 Transition n/a 
No preliminary 
views 
OL: Simplified 
retrospective 
application  
- FL: Adjust the 
carrying values 
(to ROU Model); 
no adjustments 
for simple 
finance leases 
- OL: Modified 
retrospective 
application or full 
retrospective approach 
 - FL : No required 
adjustment of carrying 
values  
- OL:  a retrospective 
approach, choice 
between fully or 
modified retrospective 
 - FL : No required 
adjustment of carrying 
values  
Allowed more 
flexibility for 
preparers by 
permitting two 
approaches for 
transition 
15 
Definition of a 
lease 
search 
No preliminary 
views 
a contract in 
which the right 
to use a 
specified asset 
or assets is 
conveyed, for a 
period of time, in 
exchange for 
consideration 
a contract that 
conveys the right to 
use 
an asset (the 
underlying asset) for a 
period of time in 
exchange for 
consideration 
a contract that conveys 
the right to use an asset 
(the underlying asset) 
for a period of time in 
exchange for 
consideration 
No change after the 
definition was 
introduced at the ED 
stage (except for 
minor wording 
modifications) 
16 
Definition of a 
lease : 
Determining 
whether a 
contract 
contains a 
lease 
Except FL / OL 
guidelines no 
specific guidance 
No preliminary 
views 
No preliminary 
views 
By assessing whether: 
(a) fulfilment of the 
contract depends on 
the use of an identified 
asset; and (b) the 
contract conveys the 
right to control the use 
of the identified asset 
for a period of time in 
exchange for 
consideration. A 
contract conveys the 
right to control the use 
of an asset if the 
customer has the 
ability to direct the use 
and receive the 
benefits from use of 
the identified asset. 
The use of an identified 
asset is either explicitly 
or implicitly specified.  
The customer controls 
the use of the identified 
asset. A contract 
conveys the right to 
control the use of an 
identified asset if, 
throughout the period of 
use, the customer has 
the right to: (a) Direct 
the use of the identified 
asset; and 
(b) Obtain substantially 
all of the economic 
benefits from directing 
the use of the identified 
asset. 
Made clarifications 
regarding the 
definition of a lease 
after the demand of 
respondents; 
tentative decisions 
are more detailed 
compared to the Re-
ED; Affects 
preparers ' ability to 
determine whether a 
contract contains a 
lease 
Sources: based on Betz & Pozzobon (2011); IAS 17; IASB & FASB (2009); IASB & FASB (2010); IASB & FASB (2013); IASB & 
FASB (2015) 
